Jun 22, 5:57 PM (ET)By PAUL WISEMAN and MARTIN CRUTSINGER
WASHINGTON (AP) - The economy's continuing struggles aren't just confounding ordinary Americans. They've also stumped the head of the Federal Reserve.
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke told reporters Wednesday that the central bank had been caught off guard by recent signs of deterioration in the economy. And he said the troubles could continue into next year. "We don't have a precise read on why this slower pace of growth is persisting," Bernanke said. He said the weak housing market and problems in the banking system might be "more persistent than we thought." It was the Fed chief's most explicit warning yet that the economy will face serious challenges next year. For several months, he had said the factors working against economic growth appeared to be "transitory." The Fed cut its forecast for economic growth this year to a range of 2.7 percent to 2.9 percent from an April forecast of 3.1 percent to 3.3 percent. It also cut its forecast for next year to a range of 3.3 percent to 3.7 percent from an earlier 3.5 percent to 4.2 percent. The Fed also said unemployment would stay higher than it had expected earlier. In a policy statement issued at the end of a two-day meeting, the Fed blamed the worsening economic outlook in part on higher energy prices and the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, which slowed production of cars and other products.
But at a press conference afterward, the second of what the Fed says will be regular question-and-answer sessions with reporters, Bernanke conceded the economy's troubles are more puzzling and potentially more long-lasting than a pair of temporary shocks. The Fed announcement, at 12:30 p.m., had little effect on the stock and bond markets. Bernanke began speaking at 2:15, and stocks started falling at about 2:30, when he acknowledged that some of the economy's problems could linger into next year. The Dow Jones industrial average closed down 80 points for the day. The Fed's statement Wednesday stood in contrast to the Fed's more upbeat view when officials last met, eight weeks ago. At that time, the central bank said the job market was gradually improving.
Since then, the economic news has been gloomy. The government reported that the economy grew at an annual rate of only 1.8 percent in the first three months of the year. It isn't expected to grow much faster in the current quarter. The economy added 54,000 jobs in May, far fewer than in the previous two months. Consumer spending has weakened, too. The bad economic news is taking a political toll on President Barack Obama. For the first time this year, an Associated Press-GfK poll found that fewer than 50 percent of respondents believe Obama deserves re-election. Obama's overall approval rating fell to 52 percent in the new poll. It had risen as high as 60 percent after the U.S. raid last month in Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden. The new Fed statement acknowledged a slowdown over the past two months. "They see the weakness," said Bruce McCain, chief investment strategist at Key Private Bank. "You can hear their concern about economic weakness despite their hope it is likely to be temporary."
The Fed stuck to its plan to bring an end this month to a program to help the economy by buying $600 billion in government bonds. The Fed also intends to keep short-term interest rates near zero "for an extended period," a phrase it has been using the past two years. Though the central bank noted that inflation has risen, it expects that to be temporary as well. The Fed has kept rates at ultra-low levels since December 2008. Abandoning the promise to keep them there for an "extended period" would be viewed as a signal that the Fed is preparing to raise interest rates. Many private economists think it will be another full year before the economy has recovered enough for the Fed to do it. Economists looking for clues to the Fed's next move didn't get much help Wednesday. "There's no obvious hint of tightening here," said Jim O'Sullivan, chief economist at MF Global. "There's no hint of new easing." The bond-buying program has been controversial. Supporters say the bond purchases have kept interest rates low and encouraged spending. Low long-term rates make it easier to buy homes and cars and for companies to expand.
They also argue that those lower rates fueled a stock rally. Since Bernanke outlined plans for the program last August, the Standard & Poor's 500 index is up 24 percent. Lower rates made stocks more attractive to investors than bonds, whose yields were falling. The average rate on a 30-year mortgage has stayed below 5 percent for all but two weeks this year and was 4.5 percent last week. But low rates haven't helped home sales much. They fell in May to the lowest level since November. Critics, including some Fed officials, saw things differently. They warned that by pumping so much money into the economy, the Fed increased the risks of high inflation later.
Showing posts with label Causes of the Collapse. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Causes of the Collapse. Show all posts
Thursday, June 23, 2011
Sunday, June 13, 2010
Obama pleads for $50 billion in state, local aid
By Lori Montgomery
Washington Post
Sunday, June 13, 2010; A01
President Obama urged reluctant lawmakers Saturday to quickly approve nearly $50 billion in emergency aid to state and local governments, saying the money is needed to avoid "massive layoffs of teachers, police and firefighters" and to support the still-fragile economic recovery. In a letter to congressional leaders, Obama defended last year's huge economic stimulus package, saying it helped break the economy's free fall, but argued that more spending is urgent and unavoidable. "We must take these emergency measures," he wrote in an appeal aimed primarily at members of his own party. The letter comes as rising concern about the national debt is undermining congressional support for additional spending to bolster the economy. Many economists say more spending could help bring down persistently high unemployment, but with Republicans making an issue of the record deficits run up during the recession, many Democratic lawmakers are eager to turn off the stimulus tap. "I think there is spending fatigue," House Majority Leader Steny H. Hoyer (D-Md.) said recently. "It's tough in both houses to get votes."
Democrats, particularly in the House, have voted for politically costly initiatives at Obama's insistence, most notably health-care and climate change legislation. But faced with an electorate widely viewed as angry and hostile to incumbents, many are increasingly reluctant to take politically unpopular positions.
The House last month stripped Obama's request for $24 billion in state aid from a bill that would extend emergency benefits for jobless workers. Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) hopes to restore that funding but with debate in that chamber set to resume this week, he acknowledges that he has yet to assemble the votes for final passage. Obama's request for $23 billion to avert the layoffs of as many as 300,000 public school teachers has not won support in either chamber.
Mixed signals
Senior Democratic congressional aides said those initiatives have not gained traction in part because the White House has not made additional spending on the economy a clear priority.
In recent weeks, for instance, the White House has appeared more intent on cutting spending -- threatening to veto a defense bill over a jet engine project that the Pentagon views as unnecessary and urging every agency to come up with a list of low-priority programs for elimination. Obama has also proposed a three-year freeze in discretionary spending unrelated to national security, an idea endorsed by leaders of both parties at a meeting at the White House last week, according to Obama's letter. With the letter, however, Obama makes a direct and unequivocal case for additional "targeted investments," including state aid and several less-expensive initiatives aimed at assisting small businesses. He specifically calls for passage of the measure that is before the Senate, which would extend unemployment benefits and offer states additional aid, increasing deficits by nearly $80 billion over the next decade. Obama asks lawmakers to be patient on the deficit, noting that a special commission is at work on a comprehensive deficit-reduction plan. "It is essential that we continue to explore additional measures to spur job creation and build momentum toward recovery, even as we establish a path to long-term fiscal discipline," Obama wrote. "At this critical moment, we cannot afford to slide backwards just as our recovery is taking hold." In an interview, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel said the letter is intended to settle the growing debate over the opposing priorities of job creation and deficit reduction and "where you put your thumb on the scale." "While some people say you have to spend and some people say you have to cut, the president wants to talk about both cuts and investing," Emanuel said. GOP alternative
Don Stewart, a spokesman for Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), called the letter full of "contradictions."
"He's calling on Congress to pass a [jobless] bill that will add about $80 billion to the deficit, but then calls for fiscal discipline; he says these measures need to be targeted and temporary, but then calls for extending programs passed in the stimulus more than a year ago," Stewart said in an e-mail.
Republicans have offered an alternative package that proposes to cover the cost of additional jobless benefits -- but not aid to state governments -- by cutting federal spending elsewhere. In contrast to the Democratic bill, the GOP measure would reduce deficits by nearly $55 billion over the next decade, according to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office.
The politics of the Democratic bill before the Senate are further complicated because it has become a grab bag of must-pass provisions. In addition to state aid and more money for jobless benefits, it includes a plan to extend $32 billion in expired tax breaks for individuals and businesses and a separate provision, known as the "doc fix," that would postpone until 2012 a scheduled pay cut for doctors who see Medicare patients. When it was first unveiled last month, the total cost of the package approached $200 billion, with only about $50 billion paid for through higher taxes on multinational corporations, hedge fund managers and certain small businesses. Conservative Democrats in the House balked, forcing House leaders to scale back the doc fix and strip out the state aid, as well as $6 billion in health insurance subsidies for jobless workers. In the letter, Obama asks Congress to reconsider that decision. The House narrowly approved the trimmed-down bill.
Now the Senate is struggling to assemble a 60-vote coalition for the measure. Reid moved last week to restore the state aid, but the CBO said the resulting measure would add nearly $80 billion to budget deficits over the next decade. Moderates objected, saying they could not support such a big increase in borrowing at a time when the total national debt has topped $13 trillion, nearly 90 percent of the gross domestic product.
On Saturday, as Obama called for urgent action, senior Senate aides said the scramble for votes would delay final action on the bill for at least another week.
Washington Post
Sunday, June 13, 2010; A01
President Obama urged reluctant lawmakers Saturday to quickly approve nearly $50 billion in emergency aid to state and local governments, saying the money is needed to avoid "massive layoffs of teachers, police and firefighters" and to support the still-fragile economic recovery. In a letter to congressional leaders, Obama defended last year's huge economic stimulus package, saying it helped break the economy's free fall, but argued that more spending is urgent and unavoidable. "We must take these emergency measures," he wrote in an appeal aimed primarily at members of his own party. The letter comes as rising concern about the national debt is undermining congressional support for additional spending to bolster the economy. Many economists say more spending could help bring down persistently high unemployment, but with Republicans making an issue of the record deficits run up during the recession, many Democratic lawmakers are eager to turn off the stimulus tap. "I think there is spending fatigue," House Majority Leader Steny H. Hoyer (D-Md.) said recently. "It's tough in both houses to get votes."
Democrats, particularly in the House, have voted for politically costly initiatives at Obama's insistence, most notably health-care and climate change legislation. But faced with an electorate widely viewed as angry and hostile to incumbents, many are increasingly reluctant to take politically unpopular positions.
The House last month stripped Obama's request for $24 billion in state aid from a bill that would extend emergency benefits for jobless workers. Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) hopes to restore that funding but with debate in that chamber set to resume this week, he acknowledges that he has yet to assemble the votes for final passage. Obama's request for $23 billion to avert the layoffs of as many as 300,000 public school teachers has not won support in either chamber.
Mixed signals
Senior Democratic congressional aides said those initiatives have not gained traction in part because the White House has not made additional spending on the economy a clear priority.
In recent weeks, for instance, the White House has appeared more intent on cutting spending -- threatening to veto a defense bill over a jet engine project that the Pentagon views as unnecessary and urging every agency to come up with a list of low-priority programs for elimination. Obama has also proposed a three-year freeze in discretionary spending unrelated to national security, an idea endorsed by leaders of both parties at a meeting at the White House last week, according to Obama's letter. With the letter, however, Obama makes a direct and unequivocal case for additional "targeted investments," including state aid and several less-expensive initiatives aimed at assisting small businesses. He specifically calls for passage of the measure that is before the Senate, which would extend unemployment benefits and offer states additional aid, increasing deficits by nearly $80 billion over the next decade. Obama asks lawmakers to be patient on the deficit, noting that a special commission is at work on a comprehensive deficit-reduction plan. "It is essential that we continue to explore additional measures to spur job creation and build momentum toward recovery, even as we establish a path to long-term fiscal discipline," Obama wrote. "At this critical moment, we cannot afford to slide backwards just as our recovery is taking hold." In an interview, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel said the letter is intended to settle the growing debate over the opposing priorities of job creation and deficit reduction and "where you put your thumb on the scale." "While some people say you have to spend and some people say you have to cut, the president wants to talk about both cuts and investing," Emanuel said. GOP alternative
Don Stewart, a spokesman for Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), called the letter full of "contradictions."
"He's calling on Congress to pass a [jobless] bill that will add about $80 billion to the deficit, but then calls for fiscal discipline; he says these measures need to be targeted and temporary, but then calls for extending programs passed in the stimulus more than a year ago," Stewart said in an e-mail.
Republicans have offered an alternative package that proposes to cover the cost of additional jobless benefits -- but not aid to state governments -- by cutting federal spending elsewhere. In contrast to the Democratic bill, the GOP measure would reduce deficits by nearly $55 billion over the next decade, according to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office.
The politics of the Democratic bill before the Senate are further complicated because it has become a grab bag of must-pass provisions. In addition to state aid and more money for jobless benefits, it includes a plan to extend $32 billion in expired tax breaks for individuals and businesses and a separate provision, known as the "doc fix," that would postpone until 2012 a scheduled pay cut for doctors who see Medicare patients. When it was first unveiled last month, the total cost of the package approached $200 billion, with only about $50 billion paid for through higher taxes on multinational corporations, hedge fund managers and certain small businesses. Conservative Democrats in the House balked, forcing House leaders to scale back the doc fix and strip out the state aid, as well as $6 billion in health insurance subsidies for jobless workers. In the letter, Obama asks Congress to reconsider that decision. The House narrowly approved the trimmed-down bill.
Now the Senate is struggling to assemble a 60-vote coalition for the measure. Reid moved last week to restore the state aid, but the CBO said the resulting measure would add nearly $80 billion to budget deficits over the next decade. Moderates objected, saying they could not support such a big increase in borrowing at a time when the total national debt has topped $13 trillion, nearly 90 percent of the gross domestic product.
On Saturday, as Obama called for urgent action, senior Senate aides said the scramble for votes would delay final action on the bill for at least another week.
Thursday, June 10, 2010
Debt Spreading 'Like a Cancer': Black Swan Author
The economic situation today is drastically worse than a couple years ago, and
the euro is doomed as a concept, Nassim Taleb, professor and author of the
bestselling book "The Black Swan," told CNBC on Thursday.
Nassim Taleb"We had less debt cumulatively (two years ago), and more people employed. Today, we have more risk in the system, and a smaller tax base," Taleb said. "Banks balance sheets are just as bad as they were" two years ago when the crisis began and "the quality of the risks hasn't improved," he added. The root of the crisis over the past couple of years wasn't recession, but debt, which has spread "like a cancer," according to Taleb, who is now relived that public attention has shifted to debt, instead of growth. The world needs to prepare itself for austerity, he warned. "We need to slash debt. Unfortunately, that's the only solution," Taleb said. Other analysts warned about austerity programs spreading from the euro zone to the US where the growth in debt will become unsustainable over the longer term. Obama administration's efforts to pull the US out of recession haven't succeeded, according to Taleb. "It's not that they make mistakes, it's that they almost get nothing right." Moreover, a second major stimulus package may be futile, he warned. "Obama promised us 8 percent unemployment through stimulus. It hasn't worked." There are significantly more liabilities in the US than in other countries around the world, he said. "Don't give a junkie more drugs, don't give a debt junkie more debt." Investors should avoid Treasurys and other bonds and place their money in instruments that will hedge them against looming inflation. Commodities are one place where a bull market may form over the coming years, as people try to protect their cash from price rises, famous investor Jim Rogers told CNBC earlier Thursday.
The "Black Swan" metaphor is used to describe those rare, unexpected but consequential events that people cannot predict because they view the world through a sort of tunnel vision - as something structured, ordinary, and comprehensible. "I want to live in a society that is robust to adverse events. We don't live in that world," Taleb said. "A bridge that's very poorly constructed will eventually break. A white swan for the butcher is a black swan for the turkey," he added. The "Black Swan" reference has become ubiquitous within popular and business culture over the past couple of years.
As recently as Wednesday, a top authority on oil reservoir management and upstream technology called the BP [BP-LN 365.50 -26.05 (-6.65%)] oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico a "Black Swan" event that, however catastrophic, has the potential to improve drilling practices in particular and the industry in general. Taleb expressed reservations about the future of BP, given the catastrophic fall in its market capitalization since the oil spill on April 20th. He suggested that incentives in corporate culture are inherently flawed. "Size is bad for companies," he said. "We shouldn't give a manager of a nuclear plant an incentive bonus. People are given bonuses to hide risk, to cut corners. The same thing happens with every large corporation. It permeates the entire economic system."
Monday, May 24, 2010
Nouriel Roubini said the bubble would burst and it did. So what next?
By Jonathan Sibun
23 May 2010
The Telegraph, United Kingdon
Holed up in the Caribbean island of St Bart's, Roubini was forced to choose between two parties. The first hosted by Chelsea owner Roman Abramovich, the second by Colonel Gaddafi's son Hannibal. While dancing the night away with a Russian oligarch or the son of a Libyan dictator might not be everyone's glass of Cristal, the invitations show just how far the New York university professor has come in the celebrity stakes.
Related Articles
Roubini on the euro
Nouriel Roubini: The Great Recession
Nouriel Roubini: Banks that are too big to fail
The latest from Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Ed Conway's economics blog
Video Interview: Link to this video
Just three years earlier, Roubini had been the object of derision in the economics community as he prophesied a US housing market crash, financial crisis and partial collapse of the banking sector. Today, as an adviser to governments and central bankers and much feted in the media, he's well aware of the power of being right. "In my line of business your reputation is based on being right," he says. "The publicity is just noise. Certainly with a global crisis, the dismal scientists are having some prominence, even if most of the economics profession actually failed to predict it."
The 51-year-old, widely known as Dr Doom, is in town to publicise his new book Crisis Economics, a crash course in the financial crisis and what can be done to avoid another.
The book does little to suggest he is uncomfortable with his nickname. Where Roubini is concerned, the great recession has some way to run. "The crisis is not over; we are just at the next stage. This is where we move from a private to a public debt problem," he says, his speech the mongrel drawl of a man who was born in Turkey to Iranian parents, raised in Israel and Italy and lives in New York. "We socialised part of the private losses by bailing out financial institutions and providing fiscal stimulus to avoid the great recession from turning into a depression. But rising public debt is never a free lunch, eventually you have to pay for it." As eurozone leaders panic and markets continue to dive, Roubini believes Greece will prove to be just the first of a series of countries standing on the brink. "We have to start to worry about the solvency of governments. What is happening today in Greece is the tip of the iceberg of rising sovereign debt problems in the eurozone, in the UK, in Japan and in the US. This... is going to be the next issue in the global financial crisis." It already is. And Roubini claims to have foreseen it as far back as 2006.
"I was writing about the PIGS [Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain] six to nine months before everyone else, I was worried about the future of the monetary union back in 2006," he says. "At the World Economic Forum I outraged a policy official by suggesting the monetary union might break up." Roubini has sandwiched a visit to the The Daily Telegraph's offices between a private meeting with Bank of England Governor Mervyn King – "I regularly meet with policy makers. I don't know if it's even worth mentioning" – and a talk at the London School of Economics. I ask him if I can see his LSE speech. "I haven't written one. I never prepare a speech, I don't even have notes. I usually just speak out of my own thoughts; stream of consciousness." It's a manner he adopts when we meet. Looking over my shoulder, declining eye contact, he moves seamlessly between what he describes as the economist's usual suspects – "the US, eurozone, Japan, China, emerging markets, inflation, deflation, markets" – as he must when teaching his 400 students in New York. The prognosis for all the suspects save China and the emerging markets is grim, little wonder given the backdrop of a 3.8pc drop in the FTSE last week and panic among investors spooked by German chancellor Angela Merkel's short-selling ban. The ban has been dismissed as fiddling while Rome, or rather the eurozone, burns.
Roubini believes Greece's problems will see the country forced to restructure its debt and raises the longer term prospect of a breakdown of the union with the potential exits of Greece, Spain and Portugal. Could it survive such a blow? "Well you could think of a world where there is a eurozone with only a core of really strong economies around Germany," he says. "But the process that would lead to one or more countries leaving the union would be so disruptive that the euro as a major reserve currency would be severely damaged." Like many economists, Roubini does not talk in absolute predictions. It is all about what could happen in worse case scenarios. But he argues they are only becoming more likely under current political leadership, the UK's new Conservative-Liberal coalition included. "I am worried about the hung parliament. Whenever you have divided, weak or multi-party governments, budget deficits tend to be higher. It is harder to make the necessary sacrifices." He dismisses the £6bn of cuts announced by the coalition as "small compared to what is needed", but rejects the idea that the UK is worse off than many of its peers.
"In the US there is a lack of bipartisanship between Democrats and Republicans, in Germany Merkel has just lost the majority in her legislature, in Japan you have a weak and ineffective government, in Greece you have riots and strikes," he says. "The point is that a lot of sacrifices will have to be made in these countries but many of the governments are weak or divided. It is that political strain that markets are worried about. The view is: you can announce anything, we'll see whether you're going to implement it." This, he explains, is the ultimate challenge facing governments. "If you're pushing through austerity while there is growth that's one thing, but if you're pushing it through while the recession is deepening, politically that is harder to sell. And the eurozone doesn't just need fiscal consolidation but also structural reform to increase productivity and restore competitiveness," he says. Germany is the blueprint, Roubini points out, but "it took a decade for them to see the benefits of structural reform and corporate restructuring". "If Spain and Portugal start today, you'll see the short-term cost without the long-term benefit and they might run out of political time," he says. "That's why I worry about several eurozone members having to restructure their debt, or deciding that the benefits of staying in the monetary union are less than the cost of it." The prognosis for the UK is, at least, a little less alarming. An independent currency gives it a few more levers to pull – quantitative easing means default is unlikely to be an issue. But that comes with its own challenges. "Eventually inflation will go up and that erodes the real value of public debt," Roubini says. "In that scenario the value of the pound will fall sharply. It could even become disorderly and that could damage the economy, the financial markets and also the role of the pound as a reserve currency." Yet another challenge for Government then. Whether the coalition can live up to it remains to be seen. And whether it thinks it has to.
Roubini is adamant that the great recession is not over. But a temporary economic pick-up, which would convince governments that reform is unnecessary, could bring its own problems.
"People asked me why I saw there was a bubble and my question was why others didn't. During the bubble everybody was benefiting and losing a sense of reality," he says. "And now, since there is the beginning of economic recovery – however bumpy that might be – in some sense people are already starting to forget what happened two years ago. Banks are going back to business as usual and bonuses are back to levels that are outrageous by any standards. There is actually a backlash against even moderate reforms that governments are trying to pass."
Reform, Roubini insists, is necessary, recovery or not. "We are still in the middle of this crisis and there is more trouble ahead of us, even if there is a recovery. During the great depression the economy contracted between 1929 and 1933, there was the beginning of a recovery, but then a second recession from 1937 to 1939. If you don't address the issues, you risk having a double-dip recession and one which is at least as severe as the first one." Roubini has built his reputation on such forecasts. So, given the real reputation builder was forecasting the crisis, has he been one of the few to enjoy the troubled times of the past few years?
"We are witnessing the worst global economic crisis in the last 60 to 70 years and for an economist that offers an opportunity," he says. "So it has been interesting, but the damage financially and economically has been so severe and so many people have suffered. Anybody involved has to bear that in mind." Perhaps the dismal science was a fair moniker after all.
23 May 2010
The Telegraph, United Kingdon
Holed up in the Caribbean island of St Bart's, Roubini was forced to choose between two parties. The first hosted by Chelsea owner Roman Abramovich, the second by Colonel Gaddafi's son Hannibal. While dancing the night away with a Russian oligarch or the son of a Libyan dictator might not be everyone's glass of Cristal, the invitations show just how far the New York university professor has come in the celebrity stakes.
Related Articles
Roubini on the euro
Nouriel Roubini: The Great Recession
Nouriel Roubini: Banks that are too big to fail
The latest from Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Ed Conway's economics blog
Video Interview: Link to this video
Just three years earlier, Roubini had been the object of derision in the economics community as he prophesied a US housing market crash, financial crisis and partial collapse of the banking sector. Today, as an adviser to governments and central bankers and much feted in the media, he's well aware of the power of being right. "In my line of business your reputation is based on being right," he says. "The publicity is just noise. Certainly with a global crisis, the dismal scientists are having some prominence, even if most of the economics profession actually failed to predict it."
The 51-year-old, widely known as Dr Doom, is in town to publicise his new book Crisis Economics, a crash course in the financial crisis and what can be done to avoid another.
The book does little to suggest he is uncomfortable with his nickname. Where Roubini is concerned, the great recession has some way to run. "The crisis is not over; we are just at the next stage. This is where we move from a private to a public debt problem," he says, his speech the mongrel drawl of a man who was born in Turkey to Iranian parents, raised in Israel and Italy and lives in New York. "We socialised part of the private losses by bailing out financial institutions and providing fiscal stimulus to avoid the great recession from turning into a depression. But rising public debt is never a free lunch, eventually you have to pay for it." As eurozone leaders panic and markets continue to dive, Roubini believes Greece will prove to be just the first of a series of countries standing on the brink. "We have to start to worry about the solvency of governments. What is happening today in Greece is the tip of the iceberg of rising sovereign debt problems in the eurozone, in the UK, in Japan and in the US. This... is going to be the next issue in the global financial crisis." It already is. And Roubini claims to have foreseen it as far back as 2006.
"I was writing about the PIGS [Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain] six to nine months before everyone else, I was worried about the future of the monetary union back in 2006," he says. "At the World Economic Forum I outraged a policy official by suggesting the monetary union might break up." Roubini has sandwiched a visit to the The Daily Telegraph's offices between a private meeting with Bank of England Governor Mervyn King – "I regularly meet with policy makers. I don't know if it's even worth mentioning" – and a talk at the London School of Economics. I ask him if I can see his LSE speech. "I haven't written one. I never prepare a speech, I don't even have notes. I usually just speak out of my own thoughts; stream of consciousness." It's a manner he adopts when we meet. Looking over my shoulder, declining eye contact, he moves seamlessly between what he describes as the economist's usual suspects – "the US, eurozone, Japan, China, emerging markets, inflation, deflation, markets" – as he must when teaching his 400 students in New York. The prognosis for all the suspects save China and the emerging markets is grim, little wonder given the backdrop of a 3.8pc drop in the FTSE last week and panic among investors spooked by German chancellor Angela Merkel's short-selling ban. The ban has been dismissed as fiddling while Rome, or rather the eurozone, burns.
Roubini believes Greece's problems will see the country forced to restructure its debt and raises the longer term prospect of a breakdown of the union with the potential exits of Greece, Spain and Portugal. Could it survive such a blow? "Well you could think of a world where there is a eurozone with only a core of really strong economies around Germany," he says. "But the process that would lead to one or more countries leaving the union would be so disruptive that the euro as a major reserve currency would be severely damaged." Like many economists, Roubini does not talk in absolute predictions. It is all about what could happen in worse case scenarios. But he argues they are only becoming more likely under current political leadership, the UK's new Conservative-Liberal coalition included. "I am worried about the hung parliament. Whenever you have divided, weak or multi-party governments, budget deficits tend to be higher. It is harder to make the necessary sacrifices." He dismisses the £6bn of cuts announced by the coalition as "small compared to what is needed", but rejects the idea that the UK is worse off than many of its peers.
"In the US there is a lack of bipartisanship between Democrats and Republicans, in Germany Merkel has just lost the majority in her legislature, in Japan you have a weak and ineffective government, in Greece you have riots and strikes," he says. "The point is that a lot of sacrifices will have to be made in these countries but many of the governments are weak or divided. It is that political strain that markets are worried about. The view is: you can announce anything, we'll see whether you're going to implement it." This, he explains, is the ultimate challenge facing governments. "If you're pushing through austerity while there is growth that's one thing, but if you're pushing it through while the recession is deepening, politically that is harder to sell. And the eurozone doesn't just need fiscal consolidation but also structural reform to increase productivity and restore competitiveness," he says. Germany is the blueprint, Roubini points out, but "it took a decade for them to see the benefits of structural reform and corporate restructuring". "If Spain and Portugal start today, you'll see the short-term cost without the long-term benefit and they might run out of political time," he says. "That's why I worry about several eurozone members having to restructure their debt, or deciding that the benefits of staying in the monetary union are less than the cost of it." The prognosis for the UK is, at least, a little less alarming. An independent currency gives it a few more levers to pull – quantitative easing means default is unlikely to be an issue. But that comes with its own challenges. "Eventually inflation will go up and that erodes the real value of public debt," Roubini says. "In that scenario the value of the pound will fall sharply. It could even become disorderly and that could damage the economy, the financial markets and also the role of the pound as a reserve currency." Yet another challenge for Government then. Whether the coalition can live up to it remains to be seen. And whether it thinks it has to.
Roubini is adamant that the great recession is not over. But a temporary economic pick-up, which would convince governments that reform is unnecessary, could bring its own problems.
"People asked me why I saw there was a bubble and my question was why others didn't. During the bubble everybody was benefiting and losing a sense of reality," he says. "And now, since there is the beginning of economic recovery – however bumpy that might be – in some sense people are already starting to forget what happened two years ago. Banks are going back to business as usual and bonuses are back to levels that are outrageous by any standards. There is actually a backlash against even moderate reforms that governments are trying to pass."
Reform, Roubini insists, is necessary, recovery or not. "We are still in the middle of this crisis and there is more trouble ahead of us, even if there is a recovery. During the great depression the economy contracted between 1929 and 1933, there was the beginning of a recovery, but then a second recession from 1937 to 1939. If you don't address the issues, you risk having a double-dip recession and one which is at least as severe as the first one." Roubini has built his reputation on such forecasts. So, given the real reputation builder was forecasting the crisis, has he been one of the few to enjoy the troubled times of the past few years?
"We are witnessing the worst global economic crisis in the last 60 to 70 years and for an economist that offers an opportunity," he says. "So it has been interesting, but the damage financially and economically has been so severe and so many people have suffered. Anybody involved has to bear that in mind." Perhaps the dismal science was a fair moniker after all.
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
IMF: Government Borrowing Is Rising Risk to World Financial System
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT
By James Rowe
IMF Survey online
April 20, 2010
-Projected losses shrinking among banks
-Government risk is new threat to prolonging financial crisis
-Credit recovery will be slow
The global financial system and the world economy are slowly regaining their health, thanks in large part to unprecedented interventions by governments, but the sharp rise in government debt during the economic crisis from already elevated levels helped create what the IMF says is the newest threat to the financial system: growing sovereign risk. That is not to say that the private financial sector is fully recovered. Indeed, the recovery in the financial sector remains “fragile,” according to José Viñals, Financial Counselor and Director of the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department.
Bank balance sheets still contain bad assets, consumers and businesses remain stretched, and credit recovery is some time off, the IMF said in its latest Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR), released April 20. Moreover, a large part of the financial system continues to rely in varying degrees upon the extraordinary measures governments began to introduce two years ago—such as purchasing bad assets from, and injecting capital into, troubled institutions.
Heavy sovereign borrowing
But the biggest threats have moved from the private to the public sectors in advanced economies. Governments not only took on many of the bad assets from private institutions but due to the recession face continuing heavy borrowing needs for the next few years. Slow growth in the real economy and high unemployment will retard tax revenues and require higher government spending—such as on unemployment benefits and job creation activities.
“In spite of recent improvements in the outlook and the health of the global financial system, stability is not yet assured,” Viñals said a news conference April 20. “If the legacy of the present crisis and emerging sovereign risks are not addressed, we run the very real risk of undermining the recovery and extending the financial crisis into a new phase.”
In a wide-ranging assessment of the state of the global financial conditions, the IMF report said:
• Improving economic and financial conditions have helped private bank balance sheets in advanced economies. The IMF sharply reduced its estimate of the writedowns or loan loss provisions banks will have to take—or have taken—to account for bad loans and securities on their books. The improving quality of bank assets means that banks will probably need less capital than previously estimated to absorb losses. But banks still will face funding difficulties in the next few years, as their bonds mature and the special government assistance programs are withdrawn.
• Credit recovery will be “slow, shallow and uneven,” as heavy government borrowing soaks up available funds and banks continue their reluctance to lend to repair their balance sheets.
• There is little evidence, at least so far, of bubbles in asset prices in emerging markets, despite strong portfolio flows to Asian and Latin American countries from investors seeking higher returns.
• Authorities must address a number of policy issues, including how to manage borrowing and spending to minimize sovereign risk.
The IMF warned that the increase in sovereign risk can hit banking systems and the real economy that produces goods, services, and jobs. Even with weaker private credit demand, governments could crowd out business and household borrowers, retarding recovery.
Moreover, if jittery investors worried about long-run government solvency cause a decline sovereign bond prices in the advanced economies, still-recovering banks, which are major investors in government debt, could face new hits to the value of assets on their balance sheets. And rising interest rates on public debt could also flow through to the private sector raising borrowing costs for businesses, consumers, and banks.
Banks improve
This potential underscores the fragility of the recovery in the banking sector, which has shown great improvement since the last GFSR was issued by the IMF in October 2009.
The latest report said that the global banking system—which two years ago faced severe funding difficulties compounded by a lack of confidence among all market participants—is recovering. “Improving economic and financial market conditions have reduced expected writedowns and bank capital positions have improved substantially.”
The report cut its estimates of writedowns of bad loans and securities that banks—mostly in Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States— will have to take during the period 2007 to 2010 from $2.8 trillion last October to $2.3 trillion (see table). Banks already have written off about $1.5 trillion of the $2.3 trillion, the IMF estimates.
Issues on the liability side of the ledger
Although the asset side of bank balance sheets is improving, the liability side may come under increasing pressure in coming months. It is clear that banks have improved their capital positions substantially, from private investors and increased earnings. And improvements in the asset picture mean less pressure on boosting capital buffers to absorb potential loan and security losses. But authorities are likely to strengthen bank capital and liquidity requirements to increase the safety of the financial system. And banks must refinance nearly $5 trillion in debt that will mature in the next three years. “This will coincide with heavy government issuance and follow the removal of central bank emergency measures,” the report said. Moreover, the overall picture masks some problem areas, the IMF said. There are problem pockets in regional banks with heavy real estate exposure in the United States; among Spanish banks, which are heavily exposed to real estate development loans; and in some regional banks in Germany. Troubled banks often bid up rates to attract funds which can then squeeze profit margins for healthier banks.
Credit recovery will be slow
Although the worst of the credit contraction may be over, banks are unlikely to boost lending substantially in the near term—both because of the continuing overhang of bad assets that remain on their books and the funding pressures they will face. Moreover the withdrawal of the special government support will further constrain bank lending.
Although private credit demand remains modest—households and businesses continue to reduce their debt levels—sovereign borrowing threatens to overwhelm it, potentially driving up interest rates, forcing private demand to shrink, or both.
No bubbles so far
A number of emerging markets and some advanced economies have become attractive opportunities for investors in most advanced economies, where returns are low and liquidity is high because of policies to support the financial sector and the real economy. Capital has flowed to countries such as Brazil, China, India, and Indonesia—as well as their trading and financial partners—which are perceived to have better cyclical and structural growth prospects.
Although these strong capital flows can create an environment conducive to strong increases in prices of assets such as real estate and equities, so far there is no evidence that these assets have been seriously and unsustainably overvalued, which could lead to the types of price bubbles that preceded the global crisis. Expansionary policies could fuel asset price inflation and the issue for policymakers is managing the consequences of these inflows. In an analytical chapter to the GFSR released April 13, the IMF explored the issues and policy options related to capital flows.
Policy implications
To keep the global financial system on its path to recovery, and manage the risks it faces, policy makers must consider a wide variety of issues.They include
• Carefully managing their budget deficits to ensure that they can sustain their fiscal policy over the medium term to avoid extending the crisis into a new phase.
• Ensuring a smooth deleveraging process that results in a vital and sound financial system that is of the right size, able to provide an adequate flow of credit to the private sector.
• Employing a wide range of tools, including macro-policy adjustments and prudential measures, to address the risks from strong portfolio inflows.
• Continue pushing for policies and regulatory reforms to improve capital and liquidity buffers, to enhance risk management, to reduce the likelihood and costs of the failure of a system institution, and to address the issue of too-important-to-fail institutions.
By James Rowe
IMF Survey online
April 20, 2010
-Projected losses shrinking among banks
-Government risk is new threat to prolonging financial crisis
-Credit recovery will be slow
The global financial system and the world economy are slowly regaining their health, thanks in large part to unprecedented interventions by governments, but the sharp rise in government debt during the economic crisis from already elevated levels helped create what the IMF says is the newest threat to the financial system: growing sovereign risk. That is not to say that the private financial sector is fully recovered. Indeed, the recovery in the financial sector remains “fragile,” according to José Viñals, Financial Counselor and Director of the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department.
Bank balance sheets still contain bad assets, consumers and businesses remain stretched, and credit recovery is some time off, the IMF said in its latest Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR), released April 20. Moreover, a large part of the financial system continues to rely in varying degrees upon the extraordinary measures governments began to introduce two years ago—such as purchasing bad assets from, and injecting capital into, troubled institutions.
Heavy sovereign borrowing
But the biggest threats have moved from the private to the public sectors in advanced economies. Governments not only took on many of the bad assets from private institutions but due to the recession face continuing heavy borrowing needs for the next few years. Slow growth in the real economy and high unemployment will retard tax revenues and require higher government spending—such as on unemployment benefits and job creation activities.
“In spite of recent improvements in the outlook and the health of the global financial system, stability is not yet assured,” Viñals said a news conference April 20. “If the legacy of the present crisis and emerging sovereign risks are not addressed, we run the very real risk of undermining the recovery and extending the financial crisis into a new phase.”
In a wide-ranging assessment of the state of the global financial conditions, the IMF report said:
• Improving economic and financial conditions have helped private bank balance sheets in advanced economies. The IMF sharply reduced its estimate of the writedowns or loan loss provisions banks will have to take—or have taken—to account for bad loans and securities on their books. The improving quality of bank assets means that banks will probably need less capital than previously estimated to absorb losses. But banks still will face funding difficulties in the next few years, as their bonds mature and the special government assistance programs are withdrawn.
• Credit recovery will be “slow, shallow and uneven,” as heavy government borrowing soaks up available funds and banks continue their reluctance to lend to repair their balance sheets.
• There is little evidence, at least so far, of bubbles in asset prices in emerging markets, despite strong portfolio flows to Asian and Latin American countries from investors seeking higher returns.
• Authorities must address a number of policy issues, including how to manage borrowing and spending to minimize sovereign risk.
The IMF warned that the increase in sovereign risk can hit banking systems and the real economy that produces goods, services, and jobs. Even with weaker private credit demand, governments could crowd out business and household borrowers, retarding recovery.
Moreover, if jittery investors worried about long-run government solvency cause a decline sovereign bond prices in the advanced economies, still-recovering banks, which are major investors in government debt, could face new hits to the value of assets on their balance sheets. And rising interest rates on public debt could also flow through to the private sector raising borrowing costs for businesses, consumers, and banks.
Banks improve
This potential underscores the fragility of the recovery in the banking sector, which has shown great improvement since the last GFSR was issued by the IMF in October 2009.
The latest report said that the global banking system—which two years ago faced severe funding difficulties compounded by a lack of confidence among all market participants—is recovering. “Improving economic and financial market conditions have reduced expected writedowns and bank capital positions have improved substantially.”
The report cut its estimates of writedowns of bad loans and securities that banks—mostly in Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States— will have to take during the period 2007 to 2010 from $2.8 trillion last October to $2.3 trillion (see table). Banks already have written off about $1.5 trillion of the $2.3 trillion, the IMF estimates.
Issues on the liability side of the ledger
Although the asset side of bank balance sheets is improving, the liability side may come under increasing pressure in coming months. It is clear that banks have improved their capital positions substantially, from private investors and increased earnings. And improvements in the asset picture mean less pressure on boosting capital buffers to absorb potential loan and security losses. But authorities are likely to strengthen bank capital and liquidity requirements to increase the safety of the financial system. And banks must refinance nearly $5 trillion in debt that will mature in the next three years. “This will coincide with heavy government issuance and follow the removal of central bank emergency measures,” the report said. Moreover, the overall picture masks some problem areas, the IMF said. There are problem pockets in regional banks with heavy real estate exposure in the United States; among Spanish banks, which are heavily exposed to real estate development loans; and in some regional banks in Germany. Troubled banks often bid up rates to attract funds which can then squeeze profit margins for healthier banks.
Credit recovery will be slow
Although the worst of the credit contraction may be over, banks are unlikely to boost lending substantially in the near term—both because of the continuing overhang of bad assets that remain on their books and the funding pressures they will face. Moreover the withdrawal of the special government support will further constrain bank lending.
Although private credit demand remains modest—households and businesses continue to reduce their debt levels—sovereign borrowing threatens to overwhelm it, potentially driving up interest rates, forcing private demand to shrink, or both.
No bubbles so far
A number of emerging markets and some advanced economies have become attractive opportunities for investors in most advanced economies, where returns are low and liquidity is high because of policies to support the financial sector and the real economy. Capital has flowed to countries such as Brazil, China, India, and Indonesia—as well as their trading and financial partners—which are perceived to have better cyclical and structural growth prospects.
Although these strong capital flows can create an environment conducive to strong increases in prices of assets such as real estate and equities, so far there is no evidence that these assets have been seriously and unsustainably overvalued, which could lead to the types of price bubbles that preceded the global crisis. Expansionary policies could fuel asset price inflation and the issue for policymakers is managing the consequences of these inflows. In an analytical chapter to the GFSR released April 13, the IMF explored the issues and policy options related to capital flows.
Policy implications
To keep the global financial system on its path to recovery, and manage the risks it faces, policy makers must consider a wide variety of issues.They include
• Carefully managing their budget deficits to ensure that they can sustain their fiscal policy over the medium term to avoid extending the crisis into a new phase.
• Ensuring a smooth deleveraging process that results in a vital and sound financial system that is of the right size, able to provide an adequate flow of credit to the private sector.
• Employing a wide range of tools, including macro-policy adjustments and prudential measures, to address the risks from strong portfolio inflows.
• Continue pushing for policies and regulatory reforms to improve capital and liquidity buffers, to enhance risk management, to reduce the likelihood and costs of the failure of a system institution, and to address the issue of too-important-to-fail institutions.
Monday, September 14, 2009
Economist warns of double-dip recession
By Robert Cookson and Sundeep Tucker in Hong Kong
September 14 2009 15:01 | Last updated: September 14 2009 15:01
The world has not tackled the problems at the heart of the economic downturn and is likely to slip back into recession, according to one of the few mainstream economists who predicted the financial crisis.
Speaking at the Sibos conference in Hong Kong on Monday, William White, the highly-respected former chief economist at the Bank for International Settlements, also warned that government actions to help the economy in the short run may be sowing the seeds for future crises. “Are we going into a W[-shaped recession]? Almost certainly. Are we going into an L? I would not be in the slightest bit surprised,” he said, referring to the risks of a so-called double-dip recession or a protracted stagnation like Japan suffered in the 1990s. “The only thing that would really surprise me is a rapid and sustainable recovery from the position we’re in.” The comments from Mr White, who ran the economic department at the central banks’ bank from 1995 to 2008, carry weight because he was one of the few senior figures to predict the financial crisis in the years before it struck.
Mr White repeatedly warned of dangerous imbalances in the global financial system as far back as 2003 and – breaking a great taboo in central banking circles at the time – he dared to challenge Alan Greenspan, then chairman of the Federal Reserve, over his policy of persistent cheap money. On Monday Mr White questioned how sustainable the signs of life in the global economy would prove to be once governments and central banks started to withdraw their unprecedented stimulus measures. “The green shoots are certainly out there – the question is what kind of fertiliser is being used on them,” he said.
Worldwide, central banks have pumped thousands of billions of dollars of new money into the financial system over the past two years in an effort to prevent a depression. Meanwhile, governments have gone to similar extremes, taking on vast sums of debt to prop up industries from banking to car making. These measures may already be inflating a bubble in asset prices, from equities to commodities, he said, and there was a small risk that inflation would get out of control over the medium term if central banks miss-time their “exit strategies”. Meanwhile, the underlying problems in the global economy, such as unsustainable trade imbalances between the US, Europe and Asia, had not been resolved, he said. Also present at the Sibos conference was Joseph Yam, who is stepping down as chief executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority after 16 years. He told delegates of the myriad “challenges” facing those working for greater stability in the financial sector.
In a hard-hitting address, Mr Yam said that large banking profits and staff bonuses led to lower financial efficiency and contributed to the financial crisis. Mr Yam is tipped to become an adviser to the People’s Bank of China, the country’s central bank, after he leaves his post next month. He said there was a conflict between the private, short term interest of financial groups to maximise profits and the public interest of effective financial intermediation that provided support to the economy. “This conflict has not been talked about much, if at all, even in central banking forums,” he said.
September 14 2009 15:01 | Last updated: September 14 2009 15:01
The world has not tackled the problems at the heart of the economic downturn and is likely to slip back into recession, according to one of the few mainstream economists who predicted the financial crisis.
Speaking at the Sibos conference in Hong Kong on Monday, William White, the highly-respected former chief economist at the Bank for International Settlements, also warned that government actions to help the economy in the short run may be sowing the seeds for future crises. “Are we going into a W[-shaped recession]? Almost certainly. Are we going into an L? I would not be in the slightest bit surprised,” he said, referring to the risks of a so-called double-dip recession or a protracted stagnation like Japan suffered in the 1990s. “The only thing that would really surprise me is a rapid and sustainable recovery from the position we’re in.” The comments from Mr White, who ran the economic department at the central banks’ bank from 1995 to 2008, carry weight because he was one of the few senior figures to predict the financial crisis in the years before it struck.
Mr White repeatedly warned of dangerous imbalances in the global financial system as far back as 2003 and – breaking a great taboo in central banking circles at the time – he dared to challenge Alan Greenspan, then chairman of the Federal Reserve, over his policy of persistent cheap money. On Monday Mr White questioned how sustainable the signs of life in the global economy would prove to be once governments and central banks started to withdraw their unprecedented stimulus measures. “The green shoots are certainly out there – the question is what kind of fertiliser is being used on them,” he said.
Worldwide, central banks have pumped thousands of billions of dollars of new money into the financial system over the past two years in an effort to prevent a depression. Meanwhile, governments have gone to similar extremes, taking on vast sums of debt to prop up industries from banking to car making. These measures may already be inflating a bubble in asset prices, from equities to commodities, he said, and there was a small risk that inflation would get out of control over the medium term if central banks miss-time their “exit strategies”. Meanwhile, the underlying problems in the global economy, such as unsustainable trade imbalances between the US, Europe and Asia, had not been resolved, he said. Also present at the Sibos conference was Joseph Yam, who is stepping down as chief executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority after 16 years. He told delegates of the myriad “challenges” facing those working for greater stability in the financial sector.
In a hard-hitting address, Mr Yam said that large banking profits and staff bonuses led to lower financial efficiency and contributed to the financial crisis. Mr Yam is tipped to become an adviser to the People’s Bank of China, the country’s central bank, after he leaves his post next month. He said there was a conflict between the private, short term interest of financial groups to maximise profits and the public interest of effective financial intermediation that provided support to the economy. “This conflict has not been talked about much, if at all, even in central banking forums,” he said.
Why some economists could see it coming
By Dirk Bezemer
September 8 2009 03:00 | Last updated: September 8 2009 03:00
From the beginning of the credit crisis and ensuing recession, it has become conventional wisdom that "no one saw this coming". Anatole Kaletsky wrote in The Times of "those who failed to foresee the gravity of this crisis" - a group that included "almost every leading economist and financier in the world". Glenn Stevens, governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, said: "I do not know anyone who predicted this course of events. But it has occurred, it has implications, and so we must reflect on it." We must indeed.
Because, in fact, many had seen it coming for years. They were ignored by an establishment that, as the former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan professed in his October 2008 testimony to Congress, watched with "shocked disbelief" as its "whole intellectual edifice collapsed in the summer [of 2007]". Official models missed the crisis not because the conditions were so unusual, as we are often told. They missed it by design. It is impossible to warn against a debt deflation recession in a model world where debt does not exist. This is the world our policymakers have been living in. They urgently need to change habitat.
I undertook a study of the models used by those who did see it coming.* They include Kurt Richebächer, an investment newsletter writer, who wrote in 2001 that "the new housing bubble - together with the bond and stock bubbles - will [inevitably] implode in the foreseeable future, plunging the US economy into a protracted, deep recession"; and in 2006, when the housing market turned, that "all remaining questions pertain solely to [the] speed, depth and duration of the economy's downturn". Wynne Godley of the Levy Economics Institute wrote in 2006 that "the small slowdown in the rate at which US household debt levels are rising resulting from the house price decline, will immediately lead to a sustained growth recession before 2010". Michael Hudson of the University of Missouri wrote in 2006 that "debt deflation will shrink the 'real' economy, drive down real wages, and push our debt-ridden economy into Japan-style stagnation or worse". Importantly, these and other analysts not only foresaw and timed the end of the credit boom, but also perceived this would inevitably produce recession in the US. How did they do it?
Central to the contrarians' thinking is an accounting of financial flows (of credit, interest, profit and wages) and stocks (debt and wealth) in the economy, as well as a sharp distinction between the real economy and the financial sector (including property). In these "flow-of-funds" models, liquidity generated in the financial sector flows to companies, households and the government as they borrow. This may facilitate fixed-capital investment, production and consumption, but also asset-price inflation and debt growth. Liquidity returns to the financial sector as investment or in debt service and fees.
It follows that there is a trade-off in the use of credit, so that financial investment may crowd out the financing of production. A second key insight is that, since the economy's assets and liabilities must balance, growing financial asset markets find their counterpart in a growing debt burden. They also swell payment flows of debt service and financial fees. Flow-of-funds models quantify the sustainability of the debt burden and the financial sector's drain on the real economy. This allows their users to foresee when finance's relation to the real economy turns from supportive to extractive, and when a breaking point will be reached.
Such calculations are conspicuous by their absence in official forecasters' models in the US, the UK and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In line with mainstream economic theory, balance sheet variables are assumed to adapt automatically to changes in the real economy, and can thus be safely omitted. This practice ignores the fact that in most advanced economies, financial sector turnover is many times larger than total gross domestic product; or that growth in the US and UK has been finance-driven since the turn of the millennium.
Perhaps because of this omission, the OECD commented in August 2007 that "the current economic situation is in many ways better then what we have experienced in years . . . Our central forecast remains indeed quite benign: a soft landing in the United States [and] a strong and sustained recovery in Europe." Official US forecasters could tell Reuters as late as September 2007 that the recession in the US was "not a dominant risk". This was well after the Levy Economics Institute, for example, predicted in April of that year that output growth would slow "almost to zero sometime between now and 2008".
Policymakers have resisted inclusion of balance sheets and the flow of funds in their models by arguing that bubbles cannot be easily identified, nor their effects reliably anticipated. The above analysts have shown that this is, in fact, feasible, and indeed essential if we are to "see it coming" next time. The financial sector is just as real as the real economy. Our policymakers, and the analysts they rely on, ignore balance sheets and the flow of funds at their peril - and ours.
* ' No One Saw This Coming': Understanding Financial Crisis Through Accounting Models, MPRA
The writer is a fellow at the economics and business department of the University of Groningen in the Netherlands
September 8 2009 03:00 | Last updated: September 8 2009 03:00
From the beginning of the credit crisis and ensuing recession, it has become conventional wisdom that "no one saw this coming". Anatole Kaletsky wrote in The Times of "those who failed to foresee the gravity of this crisis" - a group that included "almost every leading economist and financier in the world". Glenn Stevens, governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, said: "I do not know anyone who predicted this course of events. But it has occurred, it has implications, and so we must reflect on it." We must indeed.
Because, in fact, many had seen it coming for years. They were ignored by an establishment that, as the former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan professed in his October 2008 testimony to Congress, watched with "shocked disbelief" as its "whole intellectual edifice collapsed in the summer [of 2007]". Official models missed the crisis not because the conditions were so unusual, as we are often told. They missed it by design. It is impossible to warn against a debt deflation recession in a model world where debt does not exist. This is the world our policymakers have been living in. They urgently need to change habitat.
I undertook a study of the models used by those who did see it coming.* They include Kurt Richebächer, an investment newsletter writer, who wrote in 2001 that "the new housing bubble - together with the bond and stock bubbles - will [inevitably] implode in the foreseeable future, plunging the US economy into a protracted, deep recession"; and in 2006, when the housing market turned, that "all remaining questions pertain solely to [the] speed, depth and duration of the economy's downturn". Wynne Godley of the Levy Economics Institute wrote in 2006 that "the small slowdown in the rate at which US household debt levels are rising resulting from the house price decline, will immediately lead to a sustained growth recession before 2010". Michael Hudson of the University of Missouri wrote in 2006 that "debt deflation will shrink the 'real' economy, drive down real wages, and push our debt-ridden economy into Japan-style stagnation or worse". Importantly, these and other analysts not only foresaw and timed the end of the credit boom, but also perceived this would inevitably produce recession in the US. How did they do it?
Central to the contrarians' thinking is an accounting of financial flows (of credit, interest, profit and wages) and stocks (debt and wealth) in the economy, as well as a sharp distinction between the real economy and the financial sector (including property). In these "flow-of-funds" models, liquidity generated in the financial sector flows to companies, households and the government as they borrow. This may facilitate fixed-capital investment, production and consumption, but also asset-price inflation and debt growth. Liquidity returns to the financial sector as investment or in debt service and fees.
It follows that there is a trade-off in the use of credit, so that financial investment may crowd out the financing of production. A second key insight is that, since the economy's assets and liabilities must balance, growing financial asset markets find their counterpart in a growing debt burden. They also swell payment flows of debt service and financial fees. Flow-of-funds models quantify the sustainability of the debt burden and the financial sector's drain on the real economy. This allows their users to foresee when finance's relation to the real economy turns from supportive to extractive, and when a breaking point will be reached.
Such calculations are conspicuous by their absence in official forecasters' models in the US, the UK and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In line with mainstream economic theory, balance sheet variables are assumed to adapt automatically to changes in the real economy, and can thus be safely omitted. This practice ignores the fact that in most advanced economies, financial sector turnover is many times larger than total gross domestic product; or that growth in the US and UK has been finance-driven since the turn of the millennium.
Perhaps because of this omission, the OECD commented in August 2007 that "the current economic situation is in many ways better then what we have experienced in years . . . Our central forecast remains indeed quite benign: a soft landing in the United States [and] a strong and sustained recovery in Europe." Official US forecasters could tell Reuters as late as September 2007 that the recession in the US was "not a dominant risk". This was well after the Levy Economics Institute, for example, predicted in April of that year that output growth would slow "almost to zero sometime between now and 2008".
Policymakers have resisted inclusion of balance sheets and the flow of funds in their models by arguing that bubbles cannot be easily identified, nor their effects reliably anticipated. The above analysts have shown that this is, in fact, feasible, and indeed essential if we are to "see it coming" next time. The financial sector is just as real as the real economy. Our policymakers, and the analysts they rely on, ignore balance sheets and the flow of funds at their peril - and ours.
* ' No One Saw This Coming': Understanding Financial Crisis Through Accounting Models, MPRA
The writer is a fellow at the economics and business department of the University of Groningen in the Netherlands
Tuesday, September 8, 2009
The Quiet Coup: Atlantic Monthly May 2009
The crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
by Simon Johnson
One thing you learn rather quickly when working at the International Monetary Fund is that no one is ever very happy to see you. Typically, your “clients” come in only after private capital has abandoned them, after regional trading-bloc partners have been unable to throw a strong enough lifeline, after last-ditch attempts to borrow from powerful friends like China or the European Union have fallen through. You’re never at the top of anyone’s dance card.
The reason, of course, is that the IMF specializes in telling its clients what they don’t want to hear. I should know; I pressed painful changes on many foreign officials during my time there as chief economist in 2007 and 2008. And I felt the effects of IMF pressure, at least indirectly, when I worked with governments in Eastern Europe as they struggled after 1989, and with the private sector in Asia and Latin America during the crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Over that time, from every vantage point, I saw firsthand the steady flow of officials—from Ukraine, Russia, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and elsewhere—trudging to the fund when circumstances were dire and all else had failed.
Every crisis is different, of course. Ukraine faced hyperinflation in 1994; Russia desperately needed help when its short-term-debt rollover scheme exploded in the summer of 1998; the Indonesian rupiah plunged in 1997, nearly leveling the corporate economy; that same year, South Korea’s 30-year economic miracle ground to a halt when foreign banks suddenly refused to extend new credit.
But I must tell you, to IMF officials, all of these crises looked depressingly similar. Each country, of course, needed a loan, but more than that, each needed to make big changes so that the loan could really work. Almost always, countries in crisis need to learn to live within their means after a period of excess—exports must be increased, and imports cut—and the goal is to do this without the most horrible of recessions. Naturally, the fund’s economists spend time figuring out the policies—budget, money supply, and the like—that make sense in this context. Yet the economic solution is seldom very hard to work out.
No, the real concern of the fund’s senior staff, and the biggest obstacle to recovery, is almost invariably the politics of countries in crisis.
Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too many risks. Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies commonly form a tight-knit—and, most of the time, genteel—oligarchy, running the country rather like a profit-seeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders. When a country like Indonesia or South Korea or Russia grows, so do the ambitions of its captains of industry. As masters of their mini-universe, these people make some investments that clearly benefit the broader economy, but they also start making bigger and riskier bets. They reckon—correctly, in most cases—that their political connections will allow them to push onto the government any substantial problems that arise.
In Russia, for instance, the private sector is now in serious trouble because, over the past five years or so, it borrowed at least $490 billion from global banks and investors on the assumption that the country’s energy sector could support a permanent increase in consumption throughout the economy. As Russia’s oligarchs spent this capital, acquiring other companies and embarking on ambitious investment plans that generated jobs, their importance to the political elite increased. Growing political support meant better access to lucrative contracts, tax breaks, and subsidies. And foreign investors could not have been more pleased; all other things being equal, they prefer to lend money to people who have the implicit backing of their national governments, even if that backing gives off the faint whiff of corruption.
But inevitably, emerging-market oligarchs get carried away; they waste money and build massive business empires on a mountain of debt. Local banks, sometimes pressured by the government, become too willing to extend credit to the elite and to those who depend on them. Overborrowing always ends badly, whether for an individual, a company, or a country. Sooner or later, credit conditions become tighter and no one will lend you money on anything close to affordable terms.
The downward spiral that follows is remarkably steep. Enormous companies teeter on the brink of default, and the local banks that have lent to them collapse. Yesterday’s “public-private partnerships” are relabeled “crony capitalism.” With credit unavailable, economic paralysis ensues, and conditions just get worse and worse. The government is forced to draw down its foreign-currency reserves to pay for imports, service debt, and cover private losses. But these reserves will eventually run out. If the country cannot right itself before that happens, it will default on its sovereign debt and become an economic pariah. The government, in its race to stop the bleeding, will typically need to wipe out some of the national champions—now hemorrhaging cash—and usually restructure a banking system that’s gone badly out of balance. It will, in other words, need to squeeze at least some of its oligarchs.
Squeezing the oligarchs, though, is seldom the strategy of choice among emerging-market governments. Quite the contrary: at the outset of the crisis, the oligarchs are usually among the first to get extra help from the government, such as preferential access to foreign currency, or maybe a nice tax break, or—here’s a classic Kremlin bailout technique—the assumption of private debt obligations by the government. Under duress, generosity toward old friends takes many innovative forms. Meanwhile, needing to squeeze someone, most emerging-market governments look first to ordinary working folk—at least until the riots grow too large.
Eventually, as the oligarchs in Putin’s Russia now realize, some within the elite have to lose out before recovery can begin. It’s a game of musical chairs: there just aren’t enough currency reserves to take care of everyone, and the government cannot afford to take over private-sector debt completely.
So the IMF staff looks into the eyes of the minister of finance and decides whether the government is serious yet. The fund will give even a country like Russia a loan eventually, but first it wants to make sure Prime Minister Putin is ready, willing, and able to be tough on some of his friends. If he is not ready to throw former pals to the wolves, the fund can wait. And when he is ready, the fund is happy to make helpful suggestions—particularly with regard to wresting control of the banking system from the hands of the most incompetent and avaricious “entrepreneurs.”
Of course, Putin’s ex-friends will fight back. They’ll mobilize allies, work the system, and put pressure on other parts of the government to get additional subsidies. In extreme cases, they’ll even try subversion—including calling up their contacts in the American foreign-policy establishment, as the Ukrainians did with some success in the late 1990s.
Many IMF programs “go off track” (a euphemism) precisely because the government can’t stay tough on erstwhile cronies, and the consequences are massive inflation or other disasters. A program “goes back on track” once the government prevails or powerful oligarchs sort out among themselves who will govern—and thus win or lose—under the IMF-supported plan. The real fight in Thailand and Indonesia in 1997 was about which powerful families would lose their banks. In Thailand, it was handled relatively smoothly. In Indonesia, it led to the fall of President Suharto and economic chaos.
From long years of experience, the IMF staff knows its program will succeed—stabilizing the economy and enabling growth—only if at least some of the powerful oligarchs who did so much to create the underlying problems take a hit. This is the problem of all emerging markets.
Becoming a Banana Republic
In its depth and suddenness, the U.S. economic and financial crisis is shockingly reminiscent of moments we have recently seen in emerging markets (and only in emerging markets): South Korea (1997), Malaysia (1998), Russia and Argentina (time and again). In each of those cases, global investors, afraid that the country or its financial sector wouldn’t be able to pay off mountainous debt, suddenly stopped lending. And in each case, that fear became self-fulfilling, as banks that couldn’t roll over their debt did, in fact, become unable to pay. This is precisely what drove Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy on September 15, causing all sources of funding to the U.S. financial sector to dry up overnight. Just as in emerging-market crises, the weakness in the banking system has quickly rippled out into the rest of the economy, causing a severe economic contraction and hardship for millions of people.
But there’s a deeper and more disturbing similarity: elite business interests—financiers, in the case of the U.S.—played a central role in creating the crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the inevitable collapse. More alarming, they are now using their influence to prevent precisely the sorts of reforms that are needed, and fast, to pull the economy out of its nosedive. The government seems helpless, or unwilling, to act against them.
Top investment bankers and government officials like to lay the blame for the current crisis on the lowering of U.S. interest rates after the dotcom bust or, even better—in a “buck stops somewhere else” sort of way—on the flow of savings out of China. Some on the right like to complain about Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, or even about longer-standing efforts to promote broader homeownership. And, of course, it is axiomatic to everyone that the regulators responsible for “safety and soundness” were fast asleep at the wheel.
But these various policies—lightweight regulation, cheap money, the unwritten Chinese-American economic alliance, the promotion of homeownership—had something in common. Even though some are traditionally associated with Democrats and some with Republicans, they all benefited the financial sector. Policy changes that might have forestalled the crisis but would have limited the financial sector’s profits—such as Brooksley Born’s now-famous attempts to regulate credit-default swaps at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, in 1998—were ignored or swept aside.
The financial industry has not always enjoyed such favored treatment. But for the past 25 years or so, finance has boomed, becoming ever more powerful. The boom began with the Reagan years, and it only gained strength with the deregulatory policies of the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. Several other factors helped fuel the financial industry’s ascent. Paul Volcker’s monetary policy in the 1980s, and the increased volatility in interest rates that accompanied it, made bond trading much more lucrative. The invention of securitization, interest-rate swaps, and credit-default swaps greatly increased the volume of transactions that bankers could make money on. And an aging and increasingly wealthy population invested more and more money in securities, helped by the invention of the IRA and the 401(k) plan. Together, these developments vastly increased the profit opportunities in financial services.
Not surprisingly, Wall Street ran with these opportunities. From 1973 to 1985, the financial sector never earned more than 16 percent of domestic corporate profits. In 1986, that figure reached 19 percent. In the 1990s, it oscillated between 21 percent and 30 percent, higher than it had ever been in the postwar period. This decade, it reached 41 percent. Pay rose just as dramatically. From 1948 to 1982, average compensation in the financial sector ranged between 99 percent and 108 percent of the average for all domestic private industries. From 1983, it shot upward, reaching 181 percent in 2007.
The great wealth that the financial sector created and concentrated gave bankers enormous political weight—a weight not seen in the U.S. since the era of J.P. Morgan (the man). In that period, the banking panic of 1907 could be stopped only by coordination among private-sector bankers: no government entity was able to offer an effective response. But that first age of banking oligarchs came to an end with the passage of significant banking regulation in response to the Great Depression; the reemergence of an American financial oligarchy is quite recent.
The Wall Street–Washington Corridor
Of course, the U.S. is unique. And just as we have the world’s most advanced economy, military, and technology, we also have its most advanced oligarchy.
In a primitive political system, power is transmitted through violence, or the threat of violence: military coups, private militias, and so on. In a less primitive system more typical of emerging markets, power is transmitted via money: bribes, kickbacks, and offshore bank accounts. Although lobbying and campaign contributions certainly play major roles in the American political system, old-fashioned corruption—envelopes stuffed with $100 bills—is probably a sideshow today, Jack Abramoff notwithstanding.
Instead, the American financial industry gained political power by amassing a kind of cultural capital—a belief system. Once, perhaps, what was good for General Motors was good for the country. Over the past decade, the attitude took hold that what was good for Wall Street was good for the country. The banking-and-securities industry has become one of the top contributors to political campaigns, but at the peak of its influence, it did not have to buy favors the way, for example, the tobacco companies or military contractors might have to. Instead, it benefited from the fact that Washington insiders already believed that large financial institutions and free-flowing capital markets were crucial to America’s position in the world.
One channel of influence was, of course, the flow of individuals between Wall Street and Washington. Robert Rubin, once the co-chairman of Goldman Sachs, served in Washington as Treasury secretary under Clinton, and later became chairman of Citigroup’s executive committee. Henry Paulson, CEO of Goldman Sachs during the long boom, became Treasury secretary under George W.Bush. John Snow, Paulson’s predecessor, left to become chairman of Cerberus Capital Management, a large private-equity firm that also counts Dan Quayle among its executives. Alan Greenspan, after leaving the Federal Reserve, became a consultant to Pimco, perhaps the biggest player in international bond markets.
These personal connections were multiplied many times over at the lower levels of the past three presidential administrations, strengthening the ties between Washington and Wall Street. It has become something of a tradition for Goldman Sachs employees to go into public service after they leave the firm. The flow of Goldman alumni—including Jon Corzine, now the governor of New Jersey, along with Rubin and Paulson—not only placed people with Wall Street’s worldview in the halls of power; it also helped create an image of Goldman (inside the Beltway, at least) as an institution that was itself almost a form of public service.
Wall Street is a very seductive place, imbued with an air of power. Its executives truly believe that they control the levers that make the world go round. A civil servant from Washington invited into their conference rooms, even if just for a meeting, could be forgiven for falling under their sway. Throughout my time at the IMF, I was struck by the easy access of leading financiers to the highest U.S. government officials, and the interweaving of the two career tracks. I vividly remember a meeting in early 2008—attended by top policy makers from a handful of rich countries—at which the chair casually proclaimed, to the room’s general approval, that the best preparation for becoming a central-bank governor was to work first as an investment banker.
A whole generation of policy makers has been mesmerized by Wall Street, always and utterly convinced that whatever the banks said was true. Alan Greenspan’s pronouncements in favor of unregulated financial markets are well known. Yet Greenspan was hardly alone. This is what Ben Bernanke, the man who succeeded him, said in 2006: “The management of market risk and credit risk has become increasingly sophisticated. … Banking organizations of all sizes have made substantial strides over the past two decades in their ability to measure and manage risks.”
Of course, this was mostly an illusion. Regulators, legislators, and academics almost all assumed that the managers of these banks knew what they were doing. In retrospect, they didn’t. AIG’s Financial Products division, for instance, made $2.5 billion in pretax profits in 2005, largely by selling underpriced insurance on complex, poorly understood securities. Often described as “picking up nickels in front of a steamroller,” this strategy is profitable in ordinary years, and catastrophic in bad ones. As of last fall, AIG had outstanding insurance on more than $400 billion in securities. To date, the U.S. government, in an effort to rescue the company, has committed about $180 billion in investments and loans to cover losses that AIG’s sophisticated risk modeling had said were virtually impossible.
Wall Street’s seductive power extended even (or especially) to finance and economics professors, historically confined to the cramped offices of universities and the pursuit of Nobel Prizes. As mathematical finance became more and more essential to practical finance, professors increasingly took positions as consultants or partners at financial institutions. Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, Nobel laureates both, were perhaps the most famous; they took board seats at the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1994, before the fund famously flamed out at the end of the decade. But many others beat similar paths. This migration gave the stamp of academic legitimacy (and the intimidating aura of intellectual rigor) to the burgeoning world of high finance.
As more and more of the rich made their money in finance, the cult of finance seeped into the culture at large. Works like Barbarians at the Gate, Wall Street, and Bonfire of the Vanities—all intended as cautionary tales—served only to increase Wall Street’s mystique. Michael Lewis noted in Portfolio last year that when he wrote Liar’s Poker, an insider’s account of the financial industry, in 1989, he had hoped the book might provoke outrage at Wall Street’s hubris and excess. Instead, he found himself “knee-deep in letters from students at Ohio State who wanted to know if I had any other secrets to share. … They’d read my book as a how-to manual.” Even Wall Street’s criminals, like Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky, became larger than life. In a society that celebrates the idea of making money, it was easy to infer that the interests of the financial sector were the same as the interests of the country—and that the winners in the financial sector knew better what was good for America than did the career civil servants in Washington. Faith in free financial markets grew into conventional wisdom—trumpeted on the editorial pages of The Wall Street Journal and on the floor of Congress.
From this confluence of campaign finance, personal connections, and ideology there flowed, in just the past decade, a river of deregulatory policies that is, in hindsight, astonishing:
• insistence on free movement of capital across borders;
• the repeal of Depression-era regulations separating commercial and investment banking;
• a congressional ban on the regulation of credit-default swaps;
• major increases in the amount of leverage allowed to investment banks;
• a light (dare I say invisible?) hand at the Securities and Exchange Commission in its regulatory enforcement;
• an international agreement to allow banks to measure their own riskiness;
• and an intentional failure to update regulations so as to keep up with the tremendous pace of financial innovation.
The mood that accompanied these measures in Washington seemed to swing between nonchalance and outright celebration: finance unleashed, it was thought, would continue to propel the economy to greater heights.
America’s Oligarchs and the Financial Crisis
The oligarchy and the government policies that aided it did not alone cause the financial crisis that exploded last year. Many other factors contributed, including excessive borrowing by households and lax lending standards out on the fringes of the financial world. But major commercial and investment banks—and the hedge funds that ran alongside them—were the big beneficiaries of the twin housing and equity-market bubbles of this decade, their profits fed by an ever-increasing volume of transactions founded on a relatively small base of actual physical assets. Each time a loan was sold, packaged, securitized, and resold, banks took their transaction fees, and the hedge funds buying those securities reaped ever-larger fees as their holdings grew.
Because everyone was getting richer, and the health of the national economy depended so heavily on growth in real estate and finance, no one in Washington had any incentive to question what was going on. Instead, Fed Chairman Greenspan and President Bush insisted metronomically that the economy was fundamentally sound and that the tremendous growth in complex securities and credit-default swaps was evidence of a healthy economy where risk was distributed safely.
In the summer of 2007, signs of strain started appearing. The boom had produced so much debt that even a small economic stumble could cause major problems, and rising delinquencies in subprime mortgages proved the stumbling block. Ever since, the financial sector and the federal government have been behaving exactly the way one would expect them to, in light of past emerging-market crises.
By now, the princes of the financial world have of course been stripped naked as leaders and strategists—at least in the eyes of most Americans. But as the months have rolled by, financial elites have continued to assume that their position as the economy’s favored children is safe, despite the wreckage they have caused.
Stanley O’Neal, the CEO of Merrill Lynch, pushed his firm heavily into the mortgage-backed-securities market at its peak in 2005 and 2006; in October 2007, he acknowledged, “The bottom line is, we—I—got it wrong by being overexposed to subprime, and we suffered as a result of impaired liquidity in that market. No one is more disappointed than I am in that result.” O’Neal took home a $14 million bonus in 2006; in 2007, he walked away from Merrill with a severance package worth $162 million, although it is presumably worth much less today.
In October, John Thain, Merrill Lynch’s final CEO, reportedly lobbied his board of directors for a bonus of $30 million or more, eventually reducing his demand to $10 million in December; he withdrew the request, under a firestorm of protest, only after it was leaked to The Wall Street Journal. Merrill Lynch as a whole was no better: it moved its bonus payments, $4 billion in total, forward to December, presumably to avoid the possibility that they would be reduced by Bank of America, which would own Merrill beginning on January 1. Wall Street paid out $18 billion in year-end bonuses last year to its New York City employees, after the government disbursed $243 billion in emergency assistance to the financial sector.
In a financial panic, the government must respond with both speed and overwhelming force. The root problem is uncertainty—in our case, uncertainty about whether the major banks have sufficient assets to cover their liabilities. Half measures combined with wishful thinking and a wait-and-see attitude cannot overcome this uncertainty. And the longer the response takes, the longer the uncertainty will stymie the flow of credit, sap consumer confidence, and cripple the economy—ultimately making the problem much harder to solve. Yet the principal characteristics of the government’s response to the financial crisis have been delay, lack of transparency, and an unwillingness to upset the financial sector.
The response so far is perhaps best described as “policy by deal”: when a major financial institution gets into trouble, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve engineer a bailout over the weekend and announce on Monday that everything is fine. In March 2008, Bear Stearns was sold to JP Morgan Chase in what looked to many like a gift to JP Morgan. (Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan’s CEO, sits on the board of directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which, along with the Treasury Department, brokered the deal.) In September, we saw the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America, the first bailout of AIG, and the takeover and immediate sale of Washington Mutual to JP Morgan—all of which were brokered by the government. In October, nine large banks were recapitalized on the same day behind closed doors in Washington. This, in turn, was followed by additional bailouts for Citigroup, AIG, Bank of America, Citigroup (again), and AIG (again).
Some of these deals may have been reasonable responses to the immediate situation. But it was never clear (and still isn’t) what combination of interests was being served, and how. Treasury and the Fed did not act according to any publicly articulated principles, but just worked out a transaction and claimed it was the best that could be done under the circumstances. This was late-night, backroom dealing, pure and simple.
Throughout the crisis, the government has taken extreme care not to upset the interests of the financial institutions, or to question the basic outlines of the system that got us here. In September 2008, Henry Paulson asked Congress for $700 billion to buy toxic assets from banks, with no strings attached and no judicial review of his purchase decisions. Many observers suspected that the purpose was to overpay for those assets and thereby take the problem off the banks’ hands—indeed, that is the only way that buying toxic assets would have helped anything. Perhaps because there was no way to make such a blatant subsidy politically acceptable, that plan was shelved.
Instead, the money was used to recapitalize banks, buying shares in them on terms that were grossly favorable to the banks themselves. As the crisis has deepened and financial institutions have needed more help, the government has gotten more and more creative in figuring out ways to provide banks with subsidies that are too complex for the general public to understand. The first AIG bailout, which was on relatively good terms for the taxpayer, was supplemented by three further bailouts whose terms were more AIG-friendly. The second Citigroup bailout and the Bank of America bailout included complex asset guarantees that provided the banks with insurance at below-market rates. The third Citigroup bailout, in late February, converted government-owned preferred stock to common stock at a price significantly higher than the market price—a subsidy that probably even most Wall Street Journal readers would miss on first reading. And the convertible preferred shares that the Treasury will buy under the new Financial Stability Plan give the conversion option (and thus the upside) to the banks, not the government.
This latest plan—which is likely to provide cheap loans to hedge funds and others so that they can buy distressed bank assets at relatively high prices—has been heavily influenced by the financial sector, and Treasury has made no secret of that. As Neel Kashkari, a senior Treasury official under both Henry Paulson and Tim Geithner (and a Goldman alum) told Congress in March, “We had received inbound unsolicited proposals from people in the private sector saying, ‘We have capital on the sidelines; we want to go after [distressed bank] assets.’” And the plan lets them do just that: “By marrying government capital—taxpayer capital—with private-sector capital and providing financing, you can enable those investors to then go after those assets at a price that makes sense for the investors and at a price that makes sense for the banks.” Kashkari didn’t mention anything about what makes sense for the third group involved: the taxpayers.
Even leaving aside fairness to taxpayers, the government’s velvet-glove approach with the banks is deeply troubling, for one simple reason: it is inadequate to change the behavior of a financial sector accustomed to doing business on its own terms, at a time when that behavior must change. As an unnamed senior bank official said to The New York Times last fall, “It doesn’t matter how much Hank Paulson gives us, no one is going to lend a nickel until the economy turns.” But there’s the rub: the economy can’t recover until the banks are healthy and willing to lend.
The Way Out
Looking just at the financial crisis (and leaving aside some problems of the larger economy), we face at least two major, interrelated problems. The first is a desperately ill banking sector that threatens to choke off any incipient recovery that the fiscal stimulus might generate. The second is a political balance of power that gives the financial sector a veto over public policy, even as that sector loses popular support.
Big banks, it seems, have only gained political strength since the crisis began. And this is not surprising. With the financial system so fragile, the damage that a major bank failure could cause—Lehman was small relative to Citigroup or Bank of America—is much greater than it would be during ordinary times. The banks have been exploiting this fear as they wring favorable deals out of Washington. Bank of America obtained its second bailout package (in January) after warning the government that it might not be able to go through with the acquisition of Merrill Lynch, a prospect that Treasury did not want to consider.
The challenges the United States faces are familiar territory to the people at the IMF. If you hid the name of the country and just showed them the numbers, there is no doubt what old IMF hands would say: nationalize troubled banks and break them up as necessary.
In some ways, of course, the government has already taken control of the banking system. It has essentially guaranteed the liabilities of the biggest banks, and it is their only plausible source of capital today. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve has taken on a major role in providing credit to the economy—the function that the private banking sector is supposed to be performing, but isn’t. Yet there are limits to what the Fed can do on its own; consumers and businesses are still dependent on banks that lack the balance sheets and the incentives to make the loans the economy needs, and the government has no real control over who runs the banks, or over what they do.
At the root of the banks’ problems are the large losses they have undoubtedly taken on their securities and loan portfolios. But they don’t want to recognize the full extent of their losses, because that would likely expose them as insolvent. So they talk down the problem, and ask for handouts that aren’t enough to make them healthy (again, they can’t reveal the size of the handouts that would be necessary for that), but are enough to keep them upright a little longer. This behavior is corrosive: unhealthy banks either don’t lend (hoarding money to shore up reserves) or they make desperate gambles on high-risk loans and investments that could pay off big, but probably won’t pay off at all. In either case, the economy suffers further, and as it does, bank assets themselves continue to deteriorate—creating a highly destructive vicious cycle.
To break this cycle, the government must force the banks to acknowledge the scale of their problems. As the IMF understands (and as the U.S. government itself has insisted to multiple emerging-market countries in the past), the most direct way to do this is nationalization. Instead, Treasury is trying to negotiate bailouts bank by bank, and behaving as if the banks hold all the cards—contorting the terms of each deal to minimize government ownership while forswearing government influence over bank strategy or operations. Under these conditions, cleaning up bank balance sheets is impossible.
Nationalization would not imply permanent state ownership. The IMF’s advice would be, essentially: scale up the standard Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation process. An FDIC “intervention” is basically a government-managed bankruptcy procedure for banks. It would allow the government to wipe out bank shareholders, replace failed management, clean up the balance sheets, and then sell the banks back to the private sector. The main advantage is immediate recognition of the problem so that it can be solved before it grows worse.
The government needs to inspect the balance sheets and identify the banks that cannot survive a severe recession. These banks should face a choice: write down your assets to their true value and raise private capital within 30 days, or be taken over by the government. The government would write down the toxic assets of banks taken into receivership—recognizing reality—and transfer those assets to a separate government entity, which would attempt to salvage whatever value is possible for the taxpayer (as the Resolution Trust Corporation did after the savings-and-loan debacle of the 1980s). The rump banks—cleansed and able to lend safely, and hence trusted again by other lenders and investors—could then be sold off.
Cleaning up the megabanks will be complex. And it will be expensive for the taxpayer; according to the latest IMF numbers, the cleanup of the banking system would probably cost close to $1.5 trillion (or 10 percent of our GDP) in the long term. But only decisive government action—exposing the full extent of the financial rot and restoring some set of banks to publicly verifiable health—can cure the financial sector as a whole.
This may seem like strong medicine. But in fact, while necessary, it is insufficient. The second problem the U.S. faces—the power of the oligarchy—is just as important as the immediate crisis of lending. And the advice from the IMF on this front would again be simple: break the oligarchy.
Oversize institutions disproportionately influence public policy; the major banks we have today draw much of their power from being too big to fail. Nationalization and re-privatization would not change that; while the replacement of the bank executives who got us into this crisis would be just and sensible, ultimately, the swapping-out of one set of powerful managers for another would change only the names of the oligarchs.
Ideally, big banks should be sold in medium-size pieces, divided regionally or by type of business. Where this proves impractical—since we’ll want to sell the banks quickly—they could be sold whole, but with the requirement of being broken up within a short time. Banks that remain in private hands should also be subject to size limitations.
This may seem like a crude and arbitrary step, but it is the best way to limit the power of individual institutions in a sector that is essential to the economy as a whole. Of course, some people will complain about the “efficiency costs” of a more fragmented banking system, and these costs are real. But so are the costs when a bank that is too big to fail—a financial weapon of mass self-destruction—explodes. Anything that is too big to fail is too big to exist.
To ensure systematic bank breakup, and to prevent the eventual reemergence of dangerous behemoths, we also need to overhaul our antitrust legislation. Laws put in place more than 100 years ago to combat industrial monopolies were not designed to address the problem we now face. The problem in the financial sector today is not that a given firm might have enough market share to influence prices; it is that one firm or a small set of interconnected firms, by failing, can bring down the economy. The Obama administration’s fiscal stimulus evokes FDR, but what we need to imitate here is Teddy Roosevelt’s trust-busting.
Caps on executive compensation, while redolent of populism, might help restore the political balance of power and deter the emergence of a new oligarchy. Wall Street’s main attraction—to the people who work there and to the government officials who were only too happy to bask in its reflected glory—has been the astounding amount of money that could be made. Limiting that money would reduce the allure of the financial sector and make it more like any other industry.
Still, outright pay caps are clumsy, especially in the long run. And most money is now made in largely unregulated private hedge funds and private-equity firms, so lowering pay would be complicated. Regulation and taxation should be part of the solution. Over time, though, the largest part may involve more transparency and competition, which would bring financial-industry fees down. To those who say this would drive financial activities to other countries, we can now safely say: fine.
Two Paths
To paraphrase Joseph Schumpeter, the early-20th-century economist, everyone has elites; the important thing is to change them from time to time. If the U.S. were just another country, coming to the IMF with hat in hand, I might be fairly optimistic about its future. Most of the emerging-market crises that I’ve mentioned ended relatively quickly, and gave way, for the most part, to relatively strong recoveries. But this, alas, brings us to the limit of the analogy between the U.S. and emerging markets.
Emerging-market countries have only a precarious hold on wealth, and are weaklings globally. When they get into trouble, they quite literally run out of money—or at least out of foreign currency, without which they cannot survive. They must make difficult decisions; ultimately, aggressive action is baked into the cake. But the U.S., of course, is the world’s most powerful nation, rich beyond measure, and blessed with the exorbitant privilege of paying its foreign debts in its own currency, which it can print. As a result, it could very well stumble along for years—as Japan did during its lost decade—never summoning the courage to do what it needs to do, and never really recovering. A clean break with the past—involving the takeover and cleanup of major banks—hardly looks like a sure thing right now. Certainly no one at the IMF can force it.
In my view, the U.S. faces two plausible scenarios. The first involves complicated bank-by-bank deals and a continual drumbeat of (repeated) bailouts, like the ones we saw in February with Citigroup and AIG. The administration will try to muddle through, and confusion will reign.
Boris Fyodorov, the late finance minister of Russia, struggled for much of the past 20 years against oligarchs, corruption, and abuse of authority in all its forms. He liked to say that confusion and chaos were very much in the interests of the powerful—letting them take things, legally and illegally, with impunity. When inflation is high, who can say what a piece of property is really worth? When the credit system is supported by byzantine government arrangements and backroom deals, how do you know that you aren’t being fleeced?
Our future could be one in which continued tumult feeds the looting of the financial system, and we talk more and more about exactly how our oligarchs became bandits and how the economy just can’t seem to get into gear.
The second scenario begins more bleakly, and might end that way too. But it does provide at least some hope that we’ll be shaken out of our torpor. It goes like this: the global economy continues to deteriorate, the banking system in east-central Europe collapses, and—because eastern Europe’s banks are mostly owned by western European banks—justifiable fears of government insolvency spread throughout the Continent. Creditors take further hits and confidence falls further. The Asian economies that export manufactured goods are devastated, and the commodity producers in Latin America and Africa are not much better off. A dramatic worsening of the global environment forces the U.S. economy, already staggering, down onto both knees. The baseline growth rates used in the administration’s current budget are increasingly seen as unrealistic, and the rosy “stress scenario” that the U.S. Treasury is currently using to evaluate banks’ balance sheets becomes a source of great embarrassment.
Under this kind of pressure, and faced with the prospect of a national and global collapse, minds may become more concentrated.
The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump “cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.” This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression—because the world is now so much more interconnected and because the banking sector is now so big. We face a synchronized downturn in almost all countries, a weakening of confidence among individuals and firms, and major problems for government finances. If our leadership wakes up to the potential consequences, we may yet see dramatic action on the banking system and a breaking of the old elite. Let us hope it is not then too late.
by Simon Johnson
One thing you learn rather quickly when working at the International Monetary Fund is that no one is ever very happy to see you. Typically, your “clients” come in only after private capital has abandoned them, after regional trading-bloc partners have been unable to throw a strong enough lifeline, after last-ditch attempts to borrow from powerful friends like China or the European Union have fallen through. You’re never at the top of anyone’s dance card.
The reason, of course, is that the IMF specializes in telling its clients what they don’t want to hear. I should know; I pressed painful changes on many foreign officials during my time there as chief economist in 2007 and 2008. And I felt the effects of IMF pressure, at least indirectly, when I worked with governments in Eastern Europe as they struggled after 1989, and with the private sector in Asia and Latin America during the crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Over that time, from every vantage point, I saw firsthand the steady flow of officials—from Ukraine, Russia, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and elsewhere—trudging to the fund when circumstances were dire and all else had failed.
Every crisis is different, of course. Ukraine faced hyperinflation in 1994; Russia desperately needed help when its short-term-debt rollover scheme exploded in the summer of 1998; the Indonesian rupiah plunged in 1997, nearly leveling the corporate economy; that same year, South Korea’s 30-year economic miracle ground to a halt when foreign banks suddenly refused to extend new credit.
But I must tell you, to IMF officials, all of these crises looked depressingly similar. Each country, of course, needed a loan, but more than that, each needed to make big changes so that the loan could really work. Almost always, countries in crisis need to learn to live within their means after a period of excess—exports must be increased, and imports cut—and the goal is to do this without the most horrible of recessions. Naturally, the fund’s economists spend time figuring out the policies—budget, money supply, and the like—that make sense in this context. Yet the economic solution is seldom very hard to work out.
No, the real concern of the fund’s senior staff, and the biggest obstacle to recovery, is almost invariably the politics of countries in crisis.
Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too many risks. Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies commonly form a tight-knit—and, most of the time, genteel—oligarchy, running the country rather like a profit-seeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders. When a country like Indonesia or South Korea or Russia grows, so do the ambitions of its captains of industry. As masters of their mini-universe, these people make some investments that clearly benefit the broader economy, but they also start making bigger and riskier bets. They reckon—correctly, in most cases—that their political connections will allow them to push onto the government any substantial problems that arise.
In Russia, for instance, the private sector is now in serious trouble because, over the past five years or so, it borrowed at least $490 billion from global banks and investors on the assumption that the country’s energy sector could support a permanent increase in consumption throughout the economy. As Russia’s oligarchs spent this capital, acquiring other companies and embarking on ambitious investment plans that generated jobs, their importance to the political elite increased. Growing political support meant better access to lucrative contracts, tax breaks, and subsidies. And foreign investors could not have been more pleased; all other things being equal, they prefer to lend money to people who have the implicit backing of their national governments, even if that backing gives off the faint whiff of corruption.
But inevitably, emerging-market oligarchs get carried away; they waste money and build massive business empires on a mountain of debt. Local banks, sometimes pressured by the government, become too willing to extend credit to the elite and to those who depend on them. Overborrowing always ends badly, whether for an individual, a company, or a country. Sooner or later, credit conditions become tighter and no one will lend you money on anything close to affordable terms.
The downward spiral that follows is remarkably steep. Enormous companies teeter on the brink of default, and the local banks that have lent to them collapse. Yesterday’s “public-private partnerships” are relabeled “crony capitalism.” With credit unavailable, economic paralysis ensues, and conditions just get worse and worse. The government is forced to draw down its foreign-currency reserves to pay for imports, service debt, and cover private losses. But these reserves will eventually run out. If the country cannot right itself before that happens, it will default on its sovereign debt and become an economic pariah. The government, in its race to stop the bleeding, will typically need to wipe out some of the national champions—now hemorrhaging cash—and usually restructure a banking system that’s gone badly out of balance. It will, in other words, need to squeeze at least some of its oligarchs.
Squeezing the oligarchs, though, is seldom the strategy of choice among emerging-market governments. Quite the contrary: at the outset of the crisis, the oligarchs are usually among the first to get extra help from the government, such as preferential access to foreign currency, or maybe a nice tax break, or—here’s a classic Kremlin bailout technique—the assumption of private debt obligations by the government. Under duress, generosity toward old friends takes many innovative forms. Meanwhile, needing to squeeze someone, most emerging-market governments look first to ordinary working folk—at least until the riots grow too large.
Eventually, as the oligarchs in Putin’s Russia now realize, some within the elite have to lose out before recovery can begin. It’s a game of musical chairs: there just aren’t enough currency reserves to take care of everyone, and the government cannot afford to take over private-sector debt completely.
So the IMF staff looks into the eyes of the minister of finance and decides whether the government is serious yet. The fund will give even a country like Russia a loan eventually, but first it wants to make sure Prime Minister Putin is ready, willing, and able to be tough on some of his friends. If he is not ready to throw former pals to the wolves, the fund can wait. And when he is ready, the fund is happy to make helpful suggestions—particularly with regard to wresting control of the banking system from the hands of the most incompetent and avaricious “entrepreneurs.”
Of course, Putin’s ex-friends will fight back. They’ll mobilize allies, work the system, and put pressure on other parts of the government to get additional subsidies. In extreme cases, they’ll even try subversion—including calling up their contacts in the American foreign-policy establishment, as the Ukrainians did with some success in the late 1990s.
Many IMF programs “go off track” (a euphemism) precisely because the government can’t stay tough on erstwhile cronies, and the consequences are massive inflation or other disasters. A program “goes back on track” once the government prevails or powerful oligarchs sort out among themselves who will govern—and thus win or lose—under the IMF-supported plan. The real fight in Thailand and Indonesia in 1997 was about which powerful families would lose their banks. In Thailand, it was handled relatively smoothly. In Indonesia, it led to the fall of President Suharto and economic chaos.
From long years of experience, the IMF staff knows its program will succeed—stabilizing the economy and enabling growth—only if at least some of the powerful oligarchs who did so much to create the underlying problems take a hit. This is the problem of all emerging markets.
Becoming a Banana Republic
In its depth and suddenness, the U.S. economic and financial crisis is shockingly reminiscent of moments we have recently seen in emerging markets (and only in emerging markets): South Korea (1997), Malaysia (1998), Russia and Argentina (time and again). In each of those cases, global investors, afraid that the country or its financial sector wouldn’t be able to pay off mountainous debt, suddenly stopped lending. And in each case, that fear became self-fulfilling, as banks that couldn’t roll over their debt did, in fact, become unable to pay. This is precisely what drove Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy on September 15, causing all sources of funding to the U.S. financial sector to dry up overnight. Just as in emerging-market crises, the weakness in the banking system has quickly rippled out into the rest of the economy, causing a severe economic contraction and hardship for millions of people.
But there’s a deeper and more disturbing similarity: elite business interests—financiers, in the case of the U.S.—played a central role in creating the crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the inevitable collapse. More alarming, they are now using their influence to prevent precisely the sorts of reforms that are needed, and fast, to pull the economy out of its nosedive. The government seems helpless, or unwilling, to act against them.
Top investment bankers and government officials like to lay the blame for the current crisis on the lowering of U.S. interest rates after the dotcom bust or, even better—in a “buck stops somewhere else” sort of way—on the flow of savings out of China. Some on the right like to complain about Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, or even about longer-standing efforts to promote broader homeownership. And, of course, it is axiomatic to everyone that the regulators responsible for “safety and soundness” were fast asleep at the wheel.
But these various policies—lightweight regulation, cheap money, the unwritten Chinese-American economic alliance, the promotion of homeownership—had something in common. Even though some are traditionally associated with Democrats and some with Republicans, they all benefited the financial sector. Policy changes that might have forestalled the crisis but would have limited the financial sector’s profits—such as Brooksley Born’s now-famous attempts to regulate credit-default swaps at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, in 1998—were ignored or swept aside.
The financial industry has not always enjoyed such favored treatment. But for the past 25 years or so, finance has boomed, becoming ever more powerful. The boom began with the Reagan years, and it only gained strength with the deregulatory policies of the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. Several other factors helped fuel the financial industry’s ascent. Paul Volcker’s monetary policy in the 1980s, and the increased volatility in interest rates that accompanied it, made bond trading much more lucrative. The invention of securitization, interest-rate swaps, and credit-default swaps greatly increased the volume of transactions that bankers could make money on. And an aging and increasingly wealthy population invested more and more money in securities, helped by the invention of the IRA and the 401(k) plan. Together, these developments vastly increased the profit opportunities in financial services.
Not surprisingly, Wall Street ran with these opportunities. From 1973 to 1985, the financial sector never earned more than 16 percent of domestic corporate profits. In 1986, that figure reached 19 percent. In the 1990s, it oscillated between 21 percent and 30 percent, higher than it had ever been in the postwar period. This decade, it reached 41 percent. Pay rose just as dramatically. From 1948 to 1982, average compensation in the financial sector ranged between 99 percent and 108 percent of the average for all domestic private industries. From 1983, it shot upward, reaching 181 percent in 2007.
The great wealth that the financial sector created and concentrated gave bankers enormous political weight—a weight not seen in the U.S. since the era of J.P. Morgan (the man). In that period, the banking panic of 1907 could be stopped only by coordination among private-sector bankers: no government entity was able to offer an effective response. But that first age of banking oligarchs came to an end with the passage of significant banking regulation in response to the Great Depression; the reemergence of an American financial oligarchy is quite recent.
The Wall Street–Washington Corridor
Of course, the U.S. is unique. And just as we have the world’s most advanced economy, military, and technology, we also have its most advanced oligarchy.
In a primitive political system, power is transmitted through violence, or the threat of violence: military coups, private militias, and so on. In a less primitive system more typical of emerging markets, power is transmitted via money: bribes, kickbacks, and offshore bank accounts. Although lobbying and campaign contributions certainly play major roles in the American political system, old-fashioned corruption—envelopes stuffed with $100 bills—is probably a sideshow today, Jack Abramoff notwithstanding.
Instead, the American financial industry gained political power by amassing a kind of cultural capital—a belief system. Once, perhaps, what was good for General Motors was good for the country. Over the past decade, the attitude took hold that what was good for Wall Street was good for the country. The banking-and-securities industry has become one of the top contributors to political campaigns, but at the peak of its influence, it did not have to buy favors the way, for example, the tobacco companies or military contractors might have to. Instead, it benefited from the fact that Washington insiders already believed that large financial institutions and free-flowing capital markets were crucial to America’s position in the world.
One channel of influence was, of course, the flow of individuals between Wall Street and Washington. Robert Rubin, once the co-chairman of Goldman Sachs, served in Washington as Treasury secretary under Clinton, and later became chairman of Citigroup’s executive committee. Henry Paulson, CEO of Goldman Sachs during the long boom, became Treasury secretary under George W.Bush. John Snow, Paulson’s predecessor, left to become chairman of Cerberus Capital Management, a large private-equity firm that also counts Dan Quayle among its executives. Alan Greenspan, after leaving the Federal Reserve, became a consultant to Pimco, perhaps the biggest player in international bond markets.
These personal connections were multiplied many times over at the lower levels of the past three presidential administrations, strengthening the ties between Washington and Wall Street. It has become something of a tradition for Goldman Sachs employees to go into public service after they leave the firm. The flow of Goldman alumni—including Jon Corzine, now the governor of New Jersey, along with Rubin and Paulson—not only placed people with Wall Street’s worldview in the halls of power; it also helped create an image of Goldman (inside the Beltway, at least) as an institution that was itself almost a form of public service.
Wall Street is a very seductive place, imbued with an air of power. Its executives truly believe that they control the levers that make the world go round. A civil servant from Washington invited into their conference rooms, even if just for a meeting, could be forgiven for falling under their sway. Throughout my time at the IMF, I was struck by the easy access of leading financiers to the highest U.S. government officials, and the interweaving of the two career tracks. I vividly remember a meeting in early 2008—attended by top policy makers from a handful of rich countries—at which the chair casually proclaimed, to the room’s general approval, that the best preparation for becoming a central-bank governor was to work first as an investment banker.
A whole generation of policy makers has been mesmerized by Wall Street, always and utterly convinced that whatever the banks said was true. Alan Greenspan’s pronouncements in favor of unregulated financial markets are well known. Yet Greenspan was hardly alone. This is what Ben Bernanke, the man who succeeded him, said in 2006: “The management of market risk and credit risk has become increasingly sophisticated. … Banking organizations of all sizes have made substantial strides over the past two decades in their ability to measure and manage risks.”
Of course, this was mostly an illusion. Regulators, legislators, and academics almost all assumed that the managers of these banks knew what they were doing. In retrospect, they didn’t. AIG’s Financial Products division, for instance, made $2.5 billion in pretax profits in 2005, largely by selling underpriced insurance on complex, poorly understood securities. Often described as “picking up nickels in front of a steamroller,” this strategy is profitable in ordinary years, and catastrophic in bad ones. As of last fall, AIG had outstanding insurance on more than $400 billion in securities. To date, the U.S. government, in an effort to rescue the company, has committed about $180 billion in investments and loans to cover losses that AIG’s sophisticated risk modeling had said were virtually impossible.
Wall Street’s seductive power extended even (or especially) to finance and economics professors, historically confined to the cramped offices of universities and the pursuit of Nobel Prizes. As mathematical finance became more and more essential to practical finance, professors increasingly took positions as consultants or partners at financial institutions. Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, Nobel laureates both, were perhaps the most famous; they took board seats at the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1994, before the fund famously flamed out at the end of the decade. But many others beat similar paths. This migration gave the stamp of academic legitimacy (and the intimidating aura of intellectual rigor) to the burgeoning world of high finance.
As more and more of the rich made their money in finance, the cult of finance seeped into the culture at large. Works like Barbarians at the Gate, Wall Street, and Bonfire of the Vanities—all intended as cautionary tales—served only to increase Wall Street’s mystique. Michael Lewis noted in Portfolio last year that when he wrote Liar’s Poker, an insider’s account of the financial industry, in 1989, he had hoped the book might provoke outrage at Wall Street’s hubris and excess. Instead, he found himself “knee-deep in letters from students at Ohio State who wanted to know if I had any other secrets to share. … They’d read my book as a how-to manual.” Even Wall Street’s criminals, like Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky, became larger than life. In a society that celebrates the idea of making money, it was easy to infer that the interests of the financial sector were the same as the interests of the country—and that the winners in the financial sector knew better what was good for America than did the career civil servants in Washington. Faith in free financial markets grew into conventional wisdom—trumpeted on the editorial pages of The Wall Street Journal and on the floor of Congress.
From this confluence of campaign finance, personal connections, and ideology there flowed, in just the past decade, a river of deregulatory policies that is, in hindsight, astonishing:
• insistence on free movement of capital across borders;
• the repeal of Depression-era regulations separating commercial and investment banking;
• a congressional ban on the regulation of credit-default swaps;
• major increases in the amount of leverage allowed to investment banks;
• a light (dare I say invisible?) hand at the Securities and Exchange Commission in its regulatory enforcement;
• an international agreement to allow banks to measure their own riskiness;
• and an intentional failure to update regulations so as to keep up with the tremendous pace of financial innovation.
The mood that accompanied these measures in Washington seemed to swing between nonchalance and outright celebration: finance unleashed, it was thought, would continue to propel the economy to greater heights.
America’s Oligarchs and the Financial Crisis
The oligarchy and the government policies that aided it did not alone cause the financial crisis that exploded last year. Many other factors contributed, including excessive borrowing by households and lax lending standards out on the fringes of the financial world. But major commercial and investment banks—and the hedge funds that ran alongside them—were the big beneficiaries of the twin housing and equity-market bubbles of this decade, their profits fed by an ever-increasing volume of transactions founded on a relatively small base of actual physical assets. Each time a loan was sold, packaged, securitized, and resold, banks took their transaction fees, and the hedge funds buying those securities reaped ever-larger fees as their holdings grew.
Because everyone was getting richer, and the health of the national economy depended so heavily on growth in real estate and finance, no one in Washington had any incentive to question what was going on. Instead, Fed Chairman Greenspan and President Bush insisted metronomically that the economy was fundamentally sound and that the tremendous growth in complex securities and credit-default swaps was evidence of a healthy economy where risk was distributed safely.
In the summer of 2007, signs of strain started appearing. The boom had produced so much debt that even a small economic stumble could cause major problems, and rising delinquencies in subprime mortgages proved the stumbling block. Ever since, the financial sector and the federal government have been behaving exactly the way one would expect them to, in light of past emerging-market crises.
By now, the princes of the financial world have of course been stripped naked as leaders and strategists—at least in the eyes of most Americans. But as the months have rolled by, financial elites have continued to assume that their position as the economy’s favored children is safe, despite the wreckage they have caused.
Stanley O’Neal, the CEO of Merrill Lynch, pushed his firm heavily into the mortgage-backed-securities market at its peak in 2005 and 2006; in October 2007, he acknowledged, “The bottom line is, we—I—got it wrong by being overexposed to subprime, and we suffered as a result of impaired liquidity in that market. No one is more disappointed than I am in that result.” O’Neal took home a $14 million bonus in 2006; in 2007, he walked away from Merrill with a severance package worth $162 million, although it is presumably worth much less today.
In October, John Thain, Merrill Lynch’s final CEO, reportedly lobbied his board of directors for a bonus of $30 million or more, eventually reducing his demand to $10 million in December; he withdrew the request, under a firestorm of protest, only after it was leaked to The Wall Street Journal. Merrill Lynch as a whole was no better: it moved its bonus payments, $4 billion in total, forward to December, presumably to avoid the possibility that they would be reduced by Bank of America, which would own Merrill beginning on January 1. Wall Street paid out $18 billion in year-end bonuses last year to its New York City employees, after the government disbursed $243 billion in emergency assistance to the financial sector.
In a financial panic, the government must respond with both speed and overwhelming force. The root problem is uncertainty—in our case, uncertainty about whether the major banks have sufficient assets to cover their liabilities. Half measures combined with wishful thinking and a wait-and-see attitude cannot overcome this uncertainty. And the longer the response takes, the longer the uncertainty will stymie the flow of credit, sap consumer confidence, and cripple the economy—ultimately making the problem much harder to solve. Yet the principal characteristics of the government’s response to the financial crisis have been delay, lack of transparency, and an unwillingness to upset the financial sector.
The response so far is perhaps best described as “policy by deal”: when a major financial institution gets into trouble, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve engineer a bailout over the weekend and announce on Monday that everything is fine. In March 2008, Bear Stearns was sold to JP Morgan Chase in what looked to many like a gift to JP Morgan. (Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan’s CEO, sits on the board of directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which, along with the Treasury Department, brokered the deal.) In September, we saw the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America, the first bailout of AIG, and the takeover and immediate sale of Washington Mutual to JP Morgan—all of which were brokered by the government. In October, nine large banks were recapitalized on the same day behind closed doors in Washington. This, in turn, was followed by additional bailouts for Citigroup, AIG, Bank of America, Citigroup (again), and AIG (again).
Some of these deals may have been reasonable responses to the immediate situation. But it was never clear (and still isn’t) what combination of interests was being served, and how. Treasury and the Fed did not act according to any publicly articulated principles, but just worked out a transaction and claimed it was the best that could be done under the circumstances. This was late-night, backroom dealing, pure and simple.
Throughout the crisis, the government has taken extreme care not to upset the interests of the financial institutions, or to question the basic outlines of the system that got us here. In September 2008, Henry Paulson asked Congress for $700 billion to buy toxic assets from banks, with no strings attached and no judicial review of his purchase decisions. Many observers suspected that the purpose was to overpay for those assets and thereby take the problem off the banks’ hands—indeed, that is the only way that buying toxic assets would have helped anything. Perhaps because there was no way to make such a blatant subsidy politically acceptable, that plan was shelved.
Instead, the money was used to recapitalize banks, buying shares in them on terms that were grossly favorable to the banks themselves. As the crisis has deepened and financial institutions have needed more help, the government has gotten more and more creative in figuring out ways to provide banks with subsidies that are too complex for the general public to understand. The first AIG bailout, which was on relatively good terms for the taxpayer, was supplemented by three further bailouts whose terms were more AIG-friendly. The second Citigroup bailout and the Bank of America bailout included complex asset guarantees that provided the banks with insurance at below-market rates. The third Citigroup bailout, in late February, converted government-owned preferred stock to common stock at a price significantly higher than the market price—a subsidy that probably even most Wall Street Journal readers would miss on first reading. And the convertible preferred shares that the Treasury will buy under the new Financial Stability Plan give the conversion option (and thus the upside) to the banks, not the government.
This latest plan—which is likely to provide cheap loans to hedge funds and others so that they can buy distressed bank assets at relatively high prices—has been heavily influenced by the financial sector, and Treasury has made no secret of that. As Neel Kashkari, a senior Treasury official under both Henry Paulson and Tim Geithner (and a Goldman alum) told Congress in March, “We had received inbound unsolicited proposals from people in the private sector saying, ‘We have capital on the sidelines; we want to go after [distressed bank] assets.’” And the plan lets them do just that: “By marrying government capital—taxpayer capital—with private-sector capital and providing financing, you can enable those investors to then go after those assets at a price that makes sense for the investors and at a price that makes sense for the banks.” Kashkari didn’t mention anything about what makes sense for the third group involved: the taxpayers.
Even leaving aside fairness to taxpayers, the government’s velvet-glove approach with the banks is deeply troubling, for one simple reason: it is inadequate to change the behavior of a financial sector accustomed to doing business on its own terms, at a time when that behavior must change. As an unnamed senior bank official said to The New York Times last fall, “It doesn’t matter how much Hank Paulson gives us, no one is going to lend a nickel until the economy turns.” But there’s the rub: the economy can’t recover until the banks are healthy and willing to lend.
The Way Out
Looking just at the financial crisis (and leaving aside some problems of the larger economy), we face at least two major, interrelated problems. The first is a desperately ill banking sector that threatens to choke off any incipient recovery that the fiscal stimulus might generate. The second is a political balance of power that gives the financial sector a veto over public policy, even as that sector loses popular support.
Big banks, it seems, have only gained political strength since the crisis began. And this is not surprising. With the financial system so fragile, the damage that a major bank failure could cause—Lehman was small relative to Citigroup or Bank of America—is much greater than it would be during ordinary times. The banks have been exploiting this fear as they wring favorable deals out of Washington. Bank of America obtained its second bailout package (in January) after warning the government that it might not be able to go through with the acquisition of Merrill Lynch, a prospect that Treasury did not want to consider.
The challenges the United States faces are familiar territory to the people at the IMF. If you hid the name of the country and just showed them the numbers, there is no doubt what old IMF hands would say: nationalize troubled banks and break them up as necessary.
In some ways, of course, the government has already taken control of the banking system. It has essentially guaranteed the liabilities of the biggest banks, and it is their only plausible source of capital today. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve has taken on a major role in providing credit to the economy—the function that the private banking sector is supposed to be performing, but isn’t. Yet there are limits to what the Fed can do on its own; consumers and businesses are still dependent on banks that lack the balance sheets and the incentives to make the loans the economy needs, and the government has no real control over who runs the banks, or over what they do.
At the root of the banks’ problems are the large losses they have undoubtedly taken on their securities and loan portfolios. But they don’t want to recognize the full extent of their losses, because that would likely expose them as insolvent. So they talk down the problem, and ask for handouts that aren’t enough to make them healthy (again, they can’t reveal the size of the handouts that would be necessary for that), but are enough to keep them upright a little longer. This behavior is corrosive: unhealthy banks either don’t lend (hoarding money to shore up reserves) or they make desperate gambles on high-risk loans and investments that could pay off big, but probably won’t pay off at all. In either case, the economy suffers further, and as it does, bank assets themselves continue to deteriorate—creating a highly destructive vicious cycle.
To break this cycle, the government must force the banks to acknowledge the scale of their problems. As the IMF understands (and as the U.S. government itself has insisted to multiple emerging-market countries in the past), the most direct way to do this is nationalization. Instead, Treasury is trying to negotiate bailouts bank by bank, and behaving as if the banks hold all the cards—contorting the terms of each deal to minimize government ownership while forswearing government influence over bank strategy or operations. Under these conditions, cleaning up bank balance sheets is impossible.
Nationalization would not imply permanent state ownership. The IMF’s advice would be, essentially: scale up the standard Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation process. An FDIC “intervention” is basically a government-managed bankruptcy procedure for banks. It would allow the government to wipe out bank shareholders, replace failed management, clean up the balance sheets, and then sell the banks back to the private sector. The main advantage is immediate recognition of the problem so that it can be solved before it grows worse.
The government needs to inspect the balance sheets and identify the banks that cannot survive a severe recession. These banks should face a choice: write down your assets to their true value and raise private capital within 30 days, or be taken over by the government. The government would write down the toxic assets of banks taken into receivership—recognizing reality—and transfer those assets to a separate government entity, which would attempt to salvage whatever value is possible for the taxpayer (as the Resolution Trust Corporation did after the savings-and-loan debacle of the 1980s). The rump banks—cleansed and able to lend safely, and hence trusted again by other lenders and investors—could then be sold off.
Cleaning up the megabanks will be complex. And it will be expensive for the taxpayer; according to the latest IMF numbers, the cleanup of the banking system would probably cost close to $1.5 trillion (or 10 percent of our GDP) in the long term. But only decisive government action—exposing the full extent of the financial rot and restoring some set of banks to publicly verifiable health—can cure the financial sector as a whole.
This may seem like strong medicine. But in fact, while necessary, it is insufficient. The second problem the U.S. faces—the power of the oligarchy—is just as important as the immediate crisis of lending. And the advice from the IMF on this front would again be simple: break the oligarchy.
Oversize institutions disproportionately influence public policy; the major banks we have today draw much of their power from being too big to fail. Nationalization and re-privatization would not change that; while the replacement of the bank executives who got us into this crisis would be just and sensible, ultimately, the swapping-out of one set of powerful managers for another would change only the names of the oligarchs.
Ideally, big banks should be sold in medium-size pieces, divided regionally or by type of business. Where this proves impractical—since we’ll want to sell the banks quickly—they could be sold whole, but with the requirement of being broken up within a short time. Banks that remain in private hands should also be subject to size limitations.
This may seem like a crude and arbitrary step, but it is the best way to limit the power of individual institutions in a sector that is essential to the economy as a whole. Of course, some people will complain about the “efficiency costs” of a more fragmented banking system, and these costs are real. But so are the costs when a bank that is too big to fail—a financial weapon of mass self-destruction—explodes. Anything that is too big to fail is too big to exist.
To ensure systematic bank breakup, and to prevent the eventual reemergence of dangerous behemoths, we also need to overhaul our antitrust legislation. Laws put in place more than 100 years ago to combat industrial monopolies were not designed to address the problem we now face. The problem in the financial sector today is not that a given firm might have enough market share to influence prices; it is that one firm or a small set of interconnected firms, by failing, can bring down the economy. The Obama administration’s fiscal stimulus evokes FDR, but what we need to imitate here is Teddy Roosevelt’s trust-busting.
Caps on executive compensation, while redolent of populism, might help restore the political balance of power and deter the emergence of a new oligarchy. Wall Street’s main attraction—to the people who work there and to the government officials who were only too happy to bask in its reflected glory—has been the astounding amount of money that could be made. Limiting that money would reduce the allure of the financial sector and make it more like any other industry.
Still, outright pay caps are clumsy, especially in the long run. And most money is now made in largely unregulated private hedge funds and private-equity firms, so lowering pay would be complicated. Regulation and taxation should be part of the solution. Over time, though, the largest part may involve more transparency and competition, which would bring financial-industry fees down. To those who say this would drive financial activities to other countries, we can now safely say: fine.
Two Paths
To paraphrase Joseph Schumpeter, the early-20th-century economist, everyone has elites; the important thing is to change them from time to time. If the U.S. were just another country, coming to the IMF with hat in hand, I might be fairly optimistic about its future. Most of the emerging-market crises that I’ve mentioned ended relatively quickly, and gave way, for the most part, to relatively strong recoveries. But this, alas, brings us to the limit of the analogy between the U.S. and emerging markets.
Emerging-market countries have only a precarious hold on wealth, and are weaklings globally. When they get into trouble, they quite literally run out of money—or at least out of foreign currency, without which they cannot survive. They must make difficult decisions; ultimately, aggressive action is baked into the cake. But the U.S., of course, is the world’s most powerful nation, rich beyond measure, and blessed with the exorbitant privilege of paying its foreign debts in its own currency, which it can print. As a result, it could very well stumble along for years—as Japan did during its lost decade—never summoning the courage to do what it needs to do, and never really recovering. A clean break with the past—involving the takeover and cleanup of major banks—hardly looks like a sure thing right now. Certainly no one at the IMF can force it.
In my view, the U.S. faces two plausible scenarios. The first involves complicated bank-by-bank deals and a continual drumbeat of (repeated) bailouts, like the ones we saw in February with Citigroup and AIG. The administration will try to muddle through, and confusion will reign.
Boris Fyodorov, the late finance minister of Russia, struggled for much of the past 20 years against oligarchs, corruption, and abuse of authority in all its forms. He liked to say that confusion and chaos were very much in the interests of the powerful—letting them take things, legally and illegally, with impunity. When inflation is high, who can say what a piece of property is really worth? When the credit system is supported by byzantine government arrangements and backroom deals, how do you know that you aren’t being fleeced?
Our future could be one in which continued tumult feeds the looting of the financial system, and we talk more and more about exactly how our oligarchs became bandits and how the economy just can’t seem to get into gear.
The second scenario begins more bleakly, and might end that way too. But it does provide at least some hope that we’ll be shaken out of our torpor. It goes like this: the global economy continues to deteriorate, the banking system in east-central Europe collapses, and—because eastern Europe’s banks are mostly owned by western European banks—justifiable fears of government insolvency spread throughout the Continent. Creditors take further hits and confidence falls further. The Asian economies that export manufactured goods are devastated, and the commodity producers in Latin America and Africa are not much better off. A dramatic worsening of the global environment forces the U.S. economy, already staggering, down onto both knees. The baseline growth rates used in the administration’s current budget are increasingly seen as unrealistic, and the rosy “stress scenario” that the U.S. Treasury is currently using to evaluate banks’ balance sheets becomes a source of great embarrassment.
Under this kind of pressure, and faced with the prospect of a national and global collapse, minds may become more concentrated.
The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump “cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.” This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression—because the world is now so much more interconnected and because the banking sector is now so big. We face a synchronized downturn in almost all countries, a weakening of confidence among individuals and firms, and major problems for government finances. If our leadership wakes up to the potential consequences, we may yet see dramatic action on the banking system and a breaking of the old elite. Let us hope it is not then too late.
Barack Obama accused of making 'Depression' mistakes
Barack Obama is committing the same mistakes made by policymakers during the Great Depression, according to a new study endorsed by Nobel laureate James Buchanan.
By Edmund Conway
06 Sep 2009
History repeating itself? President Obama has been accused by some economists of making the same mistakes policymakers in the US made in the Great Depression, which followed the Wall Street crash of 1929, pictured Photo: AP
His policies even have the potential to consign the US to a similar fate as Argentina, which suffered a painful and humiliating slide from first to Third World status last century, the paper says.
There are "troubling similarities" between the US President's actions since taking office and those which in the 1930s sent the US and much of the world spiralling into the worst economic collapse in recorded history, says the new pamphlet, published by the Institute of Economic Affairs.
In particular, the authors, economists Charles Rowley of George Mason University and Nathanael Smith of the Locke Institute, claim that the White House's plans to pour hundreds of billions of dollars of cash into the economy will undermine it in the long run. They say that by employing deficit spending and increased state intervention President Obama will ultimately hamper the long-term growth potential of the US economy and may risk delaying full economic recovery by several years.
The study represents a challenge to the widely held view that Keynesian fiscal policies helped the US recover from the Depression which started in the early 1930s. The authors say: "[Franklin D Roosevelt's] interventionist policies and draconian tax increases delayed full economic recovery by several years by exacerbating a climate of pessimistic expectations that drove down private capital formation and household consumption to unprecedented lows."
Although the authors support the Federal Reserve's moves to slash interest rates to just above zero and embark on quantitative easing, pumping cash directly into the system, they warn that greater intervention could set the US back further. Rowley says: "It is also not impossible that the US will experience the kind of economic collapse from first to Third World status experienced by Argentina under the national-socialist governance of Juan Peron."
The paper, which recommends that the US return to a more laissez-faire economic system rather than intervening further in activity, has been endorsed by Nobel laureate James Buchanan, who said: "We have learned some things from comparable experiences of the 1930s' Great Depression, perhaps enough to reduce the severity of the current contraction. But we have made no progress toward putting limits on political leaders, who act out their natural proclivities without any basic understanding of what makes capitalism work."
By Edmund Conway
06 Sep 2009
History repeating itself? President Obama has been accused by some economists of making the same mistakes policymakers in the US made in the Great Depression, which followed the Wall Street crash of 1929, pictured Photo: AP
His policies even have the potential to consign the US to a similar fate as Argentina, which suffered a painful and humiliating slide from first to Third World status last century, the paper says.
There are "troubling similarities" between the US President's actions since taking office and those which in the 1930s sent the US and much of the world spiralling into the worst economic collapse in recorded history, says the new pamphlet, published by the Institute of Economic Affairs.
In particular, the authors, economists Charles Rowley of George Mason University and Nathanael Smith of the Locke Institute, claim that the White House's plans to pour hundreds of billions of dollars of cash into the economy will undermine it in the long run. They say that by employing deficit spending and increased state intervention President Obama will ultimately hamper the long-term growth potential of the US economy and may risk delaying full economic recovery by several years.
The study represents a challenge to the widely held view that Keynesian fiscal policies helped the US recover from the Depression which started in the early 1930s. The authors say: "[Franklin D Roosevelt's] interventionist policies and draconian tax increases delayed full economic recovery by several years by exacerbating a climate of pessimistic expectations that drove down private capital formation and household consumption to unprecedented lows."
Although the authors support the Federal Reserve's moves to slash interest rates to just above zero and embark on quantitative easing, pumping cash directly into the system, they warn that greater intervention could set the US back further. Rowley says: "It is also not impossible that the US will experience the kind of economic collapse from first to Third World status experienced by Argentina under the national-socialist governance of Juan Peron."
The paper, which recommends that the US return to a more laissez-faire economic system rather than intervening further in activity, has been endorsed by Nobel laureate James Buchanan, who said: "We have learned some things from comparable experiences of the 1930s' Great Depression, perhaps enough to reduce the severity of the current contraction. But we have made no progress toward putting limits on political leaders, who act out their natural proclivities without any basic understanding of what makes capitalism work."
Friday, August 28, 2009
Roubini Sees Big 'Double-Dip' Risk: Report
Reuters
24 Aug 2009 12:20 AM ET
Nouriel Roubini, one of the few economists who accurately predicted the magnitude of theworld's recent financial troubles, sees a "big risk" of a double-dip recession, according to an opinion piece posted on the Financial Times' Web site on Sunday. Roubini, a professor at New York University's Stern School of Business, said it appears the global economy will bottom out in the second half of this year, and that U.S. and westernEuropean economies will likely experience "anemic" and "below trend" growth for at least a couple of years. Yet he warned that policymakers face a "damned if they do and damned if they don't" conundrum in trying to unwind their massive fiscal and monetary stimuli to keep the global economy from toppling into a depression. He said that if policymakers try to fight rising budget deficits by raising taxes and cutting spending, they could undermine any recovery. On the other hand, he said if they maintain large deficits, worries about excessive inflation will grow, causing bond yields and borrowing rates to rise and perhaps choking off economic growth. Roubini said another reason to worry is that energy, food and oil prices are rising faster than fundamentals warrant, and could be driven higher by speculation or if excessive liquiditycreates artificially high demand. He said the global economy "could not withstand another contractionary shock" if speculation drives oil rapidly toward $100 per barrel. U.S. crude oil futures traded Friday at about $73.83. Roubini said the anemic growth he expects would follow a couple of quarters of rapid growth, as inventories and production levels recover from near-depression levels.
24 Aug 2009 12:20 AM ET
Nouriel Roubini, one of the few economists who accurately predicted the magnitude of theworld's recent financial troubles, sees a "big risk" of a double-dip recession, according to an opinion piece posted on the Financial Times' Web site on Sunday. Roubini, a professor at New York University's Stern School of Business, said it appears the global economy will bottom out in the second half of this year, and that U.S. and westernEuropean economies will likely experience "anemic" and "below trend" growth for at least a couple of years. Yet he warned that policymakers face a "damned if they do and damned if they don't" conundrum in trying to unwind their massive fiscal and monetary stimuli to keep the global economy from toppling into a depression. He said that if policymakers try to fight rising budget deficits by raising taxes and cutting spending, they could undermine any recovery. On the other hand, he said if they maintain large deficits, worries about excessive inflation will grow, causing bond yields and borrowing rates to rise and perhaps choking off economic growth. Roubini said another reason to worry is that energy, food and oil prices are rising faster than fundamentals warrant, and could be driven higher by speculation or if excessive liquiditycreates artificially high demand. He said the global economy "could not withstand another contractionary shock" if speculation drives oil rapidly toward $100 per barrel. U.S. crude oil futures traded Friday at about $73.83. Roubini said the anemic growth he expects would follow a couple of quarters of rapid growth, as inventories and production levels recover from near-depression levels.
Friday, August 21, 2009
Bernanke at London School of Economics
by Terry Easton (more by this author)
January 16, 2009
Human Events
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke flew into London to meet with Governor Mervyn King, his counterpart at the Bank of England, and Prime Minister Gordon Brown at #10 Downing Street on Tuesday. He then went on to deliver the annual Joseph Charles Stamp Memorial Lecture entitled “The Crisis and the Policy Response” to our current global financial system meltdown. Human Events was there to cover the event -- and to quiz Dr. Bernanke in the Q&A session on his Keynesian approach to the systemic money problem. The world’s media covered the event live, including the BBC, CNBC, Fox News, CNN, and Bloomberg. For a clip of our Q&A, see: CNBC Video.OK. So here’s the problem. Keynesian solutions just don’t work. Throwing money from helicopters (or more likely C-17’s today) might just pull us out of the Great Depression II, but as we stretch the rubber band, eventually the block of deadweight banking system credit will finally spring to life and violently overshoot way before future Fed and Treasury Secretaries can reel in the excess money. The result? Massive inflation from 2010 onwards. 25-30% would not be surprising through the teens. Yikes! (That’s a techno-speak economist term for holy s***, it’s that bad…)So if you think gold is high at $850 today, wait until it reaches $3,000 a troy ounce. Ditto commodities (especially agriculture). Jim Rogers has been warning about this probability for the past year. He’s been riding the commodity prices all the way down in the process -- and he’s still positive about their future. I, for one, wouldn’t easily bet against the co-founder (along with George Soros) of the Quantum Fund.At the London School of Economics, former home (1931-1950) of Austrian-school founder and Nobel Prize winner Fredrich von Hayek, Dr. Bernanke went on to point out all the Keynesian goodies he has in his “toolkit” which the Fed is using to overcome the crisis.Chairman Bernanke acknowledges that the bottom line problem -- which began with the funny-money mortgages politically made to underqualified borrowers -- has seqway’d into a full-blown global loss of trust by just about everyone, consumers and bankers alike, in the present financial system. Or, in FedSpeak: “Rising credit risks and intense risk aversion have pushed credit spreads to unprecedented levels…Heightened systemic risks, falling asset values and tightening credit have in turn taken a heavy toll on business and consumer confidence and participated a sharp slowing in global economic activity. The damage, in terms of lost output, lost jobs, and lost wealth, is already substantial”.Of course, the unspoken statement is that the reason that the people don’t trust the present fractional banking system -- and are hording their precious cash -- is that the entire system is a house of cards, or more like the game of chairs where the last person standing when the music stops doesn’t have a chair to sit on. And nobody wants to be that last person standing when the music stops.Bernanke goes on to observe, chillingly: “the global economy will recover, but the timing and strength of the recovery are highly uncertain”. That’s telling it like it is.The Fed’s toolkit -- which has been newly invented over the past 18 months -- has three groups. They “all make use of the asset side of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet”. This means, they consist of creating more money out of thin air.“The first set of tools, which are closely tied to the central bank’s traditional role as the lender of last resort, involve the provision of short-term liquidity”. It’s important to note that the reason the central bank is known as the “lender of last resort” is that when it collapses, the entire edifice falls and a new system must be built to replace the old. In these cases, the political system often falls as well. Whether a free-market-oriented democracy or a socialist-oriented totalitarian system springs up to replace the former ruin depends on the people -- both the average citizen and the elite.The question is, what kind of new system will arise from the Federal Reserve ashes? Another Keynesian Ponzi-scheme or a solid hard-money-based Austrian-school bank? The reason, of course, that Austrians like gold is it can’t easily be counterfeited by the government. It’s quite a “barbaric metal”. In the people’s hands, it can’t easily be controlled by the bureaucrats. Darn.It may just be possible, however, that Bernanke and colleagues can begin to move the Federal Reserve away from a fiat-based money system. You don’t really think there’s money in the banks to cover all your deposits, do you? And what do you mean by money, anyway: “legal tender IOU notes”? Bernanke knows this all too well. And if he can get us through this Keynesian-induced hell with just one more dose of Keynesian money printing, then maybe he’ll have the time somewhere in the future to move the system back to a gold-standard dollar. Hmmm…The tools in the first set are: 1) cutting fed funds and “discount window” interest rates, 2) increasing the length of the overnight “discount window” from 24 hours to 90 days, 3) the new “Term Auction Facility” which lends more money to the banks for “good” assets, 4) the new “Term Securities Lending Facility” which allows certain stock brokers to borrow money from the Fed for “less-liquid collateral”, and 5) the “Primary Dealer Credit Facility”, yet another bail-out loan facility for otherwise bankrupt stock brokers.In addition to the above “short term” loan programs to US banks and stock brokers, the Fed has printed up more US dollars to convert into foreign currency using “bilateral currency swap agreements with 14 foreign central banks”. Why? Because the world has run out of dollars to spend in paying its bills! No problem, we’ll print up some more dollars for you too. Happy to oblige!The second set of policy tools “involve the provision of liquidity directly to borrowers and investors in key credit markets”. They are: 1) money printed up to purchase commercial paper, 2) money printed up to purchase money-market funds, and 3) a Fed-Treasury joint money printing program to buy up AAA-rated student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and SBA loans. Finally, the third set of new “policy tools” includes creating more money to buy up longer-term securities including $600 billion in Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSE’s like Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) and GSE-backed securities. The home mortgage market “dropped significantly on the announcement of this program”. The message: don’t bet against the Fed’s ability to print mountains of dollars -- at least in the short term. The result of all this newly-created money is that the Fed’s own balance sheet -- which took 90 years to reach the first $800 billion -- is now well on the way to $3 trillion, and that’s all money created out of thin air. Consequently over the next 6 months, look for the Fed to bail out ever more failing financial institutions -- starting with another multi-billion-dollar kick to the near-bankrupt Bank of America. This second round of funny money will be followed by a third and perhaps more, until we’ll all be swimming in a sea of dollar bills. As the recession bites deeper, the velocity of money -- how fast we spend it -- slows precipitously, and huge doses of more raw money are perceived by the money controllers as the only way to pull us out of this government-created mess. What else can they do? The Austrian economist Murray Rothbard revealed the simple answer in his History of Money and Banking. Politicians everywhere need to read it immediately.Professor Bernanke is a genuinely likeable person with a good sense of humor and a deep knowledge of how the financial world really works. He was warmly received by the LSE students and faculty in London. Unfortunately, he is also the head of the biggest fiat-banking scheme ever devised by mankind. And he knows it. (Thank you John Pierpont Morgan for your Jekyll Island creation.)The tell is that his voice waivers when he is saying something that he hopes will come true but is unsure of. Listen to his speeches yourself and you’ll hear what I mean immediately. It’s the giveaway of a basically honest and decent man. Bernanke still needs to fully master the “FedSpeak” of his predecessor, Alan Greenspan. Alan could easily tell the House Banking Committee about how the Fed was fully in control - and there was nothing to worry about. And they believed it. Yet he was a protégé of Ayn Rand and the author of a marvellous essay on the need for gold-backed central banking in his youth. Years before he too became the head of the Fed.I truly hope that Chairman Bernanke can pull it all off just one more time. Like a junky hooked on ever-increasing doses of the good stuff, I need just a little more money, please. The withdrawal is too painful and I don’t want to hurt that much. I promise to go straight and reform in the future. Trust me. In fact, trust all of us. We’re all in this together.
Mr. Easton teaches University economics and is passionate about technology and entrepreneurship. He is rosy about the long-term future: �The glass isn�t half full, it�s overflowing!�
January 16, 2009
Human Events
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke flew into London to meet with Governor Mervyn King, his counterpart at the Bank of England, and Prime Minister Gordon Brown at #10 Downing Street on Tuesday. He then went on to deliver the annual Joseph Charles Stamp Memorial Lecture entitled “The Crisis and the Policy Response” to our current global financial system meltdown. Human Events was there to cover the event -- and to quiz Dr. Bernanke in the Q&A session on his Keynesian approach to the systemic money problem. The world’s media covered the event live, including the BBC, CNBC, Fox News, CNN, and Bloomberg. For a clip of our Q&A, see: CNBC Video.OK. So here’s the problem. Keynesian solutions just don’t work. Throwing money from helicopters (or more likely C-17’s today) might just pull us out of the Great Depression II, but as we stretch the rubber band, eventually the block of deadweight banking system credit will finally spring to life and violently overshoot way before future Fed and Treasury Secretaries can reel in the excess money. The result? Massive inflation from 2010 onwards. 25-30% would not be surprising through the teens. Yikes! (That’s a techno-speak economist term for holy s***, it’s that bad…)So if you think gold is high at $850 today, wait until it reaches $3,000 a troy ounce. Ditto commodities (especially agriculture). Jim Rogers has been warning about this probability for the past year. He’s been riding the commodity prices all the way down in the process -- and he’s still positive about their future. I, for one, wouldn’t easily bet against the co-founder (along with George Soros) of the Quantum Fund.At the London School of Economics, former home (1931-1950) of Austrian-school founder and Nobel Prize winner Fredrich von Hayek, Dr. Bernanke went on to point out all the Keynesian goodies he has in his “toolkit” which the Fed is using to overcome the crisis.Chairman Bernanke acknowledges that the bottom line problem -- which began with the funny-money mortgages politically made to underqualified borrowers -- has seqway’d into a full-blown global loss of trust by just about everyone, consumers and bankers alike, in the present financial system. Or, in FedSpeak: “Rising credit risks and intense risk aversion have pushed credit spreads to unprecedented levels…Heightened systemic risks, falling asset values and tightening credit have in turn taken a heavy toll on business and consumer confidence and participated a sharp slowing in global economic activity. The damage, in terms of lost output, lost jobs, and lost wealth, is already substantial”.Of course, the unspoken statement is that the reason that the people don’t trust the present fractional banking system -- and are hording their precious cash -- is that the entire system is a house of cards, or more like the game of chairs where the last person standing when the music stops doesn’t have a chair to sit on. And nobody wants to be that last person standing when the music stops.Bernanke goes on to observe, chillingly: “the global economy will recover, but the timing and strength of the recovery are highly uncertain”. That’s telling it like it is.The Fed’s toolkit -- which has been newly invented over the past 18 months -- has three groups. They “all make use of the asset side of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet”. This means, they consist of creating more money out of thin air.“The first set of tools, which are closely tied to the central bank’s traditional role as the lender of last resort, involve the provision of short-term liquidity”. It’s important to note that the reason the central bank is known as the “lender of last resort” is that when it collapses, the entire edifice falls and a new system must be built to replace the old. In these cases, the political system often falls as well. Whether a free-market-oriented democracy or a socialist-oriented totalitarian system springs up to replace the former ruin depends on the people -- both the average citizen and the elite.The question is, what kind of new system will arise from the Federal Reserve ashes? Another Keynesian Ponzi-scheme or a solid hard-money-based Austrian-school bank? The reason, of course, that Austrians like gold is it can’t easily be counterfeited by the government. It’s quite a “barbaric metal”. In the people’s hands, it can’t easily be controlled by the bureaucrats. Darn.It may just be possible, however, that Bernanke and colleagues can begin to move the Federal Reserve away from a fiat-based money system. You don’t really think there’s money in the banks to cover all your deposits, do you? And what do you mean by money, anyway: “legal tender IOU notes”? Bernanke knows this all too well. And if he can get us through this Keynesian-induced hell with just one more dose of Keynesian money printing, then maybe he’ll have the time somewhere in the future to move the system back to a gold-standard dollar. Hmmm…The tools in the first set are: 1) cutting fed funds and “discount window” interest rates, 2) increasing the length of the overnight “discount window” from 24 hours to 90 days, 3) the new “Term Auction Facility” which lends more money to the banks for “good” assets, 4) the new “Term Securities Lending Facility” which allows certain stock brokers to borrow money from the Fed for “less-liquid collateral”, and 5) the “Primary Dealer Credit Facility”, yet another bail-out loan facility for otherwise bankrupt stock brokers.In addition to the above “short term” loan programs to US banks and stock brokers, the Fed has printed up more US dollars to convert into foreign currency using “bilateral currency swap agreements with 14 foreign central banks”. Why? Because the world has run out of dollars to spend in paying its bills! No problem, we’ll print up some more dollars for you too. Happy to oblige!The second set of policy tools “involve the provision of liquidity directly to borrowers and investors in key credit markets”. They are: 1) money printed up to purchase commercial paper, 2) money printed up to purchase money-market funds, and 3) a Fed-Treasury joint money printing program to buy up AAA-rated student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and SBA loans. Finally, the third set of new “policy tools” includes creating more money to buy up longer-term securities including $600 billion in Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSE’s like Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) and GSE-backed securities. The home mortgage market “dropped significantly on the announcement of this program”. The message: don’t bet against the Fed’s ability to print mountains of dollars -- at least in the short term. The result of all this newly-created money is that the Fed’s own balance sheet -- which took 90 years to reach the first $800 billion -- is now well on the way to $3 trillion, and that’s all money created out of thin air. Consequently over the next 6 months, look for the Fed to bail out ever more failing financial institutions -- starting with another multi-billion-dollar kick to the near-bankrupt Bank of America. This second round of funny money will be followed by a third and perhaps more, until we’ll all be swimming in a sea of dollar bills. As the recession bites deeper, the velocity of money -- how fast we spend it -- slows precipitously, and huge doses of more raw money are perceived by the money controllers as the only way to pull us out of this government-created mess. What else can they do? The Austrian economist Murray Rothbard revealed the simple answer in his History of Money and Banking. Politicians everywhere need to read it immediately.Professor Bernanke is a genuinely likeable person with a good sense of humor and a deep knowledge of how the financial world really works. He was warmly received by the LSE students and faculty in London. Unfortunately, he is also the head of the biggest fiat-banking scheme ever devised by mankind. And he knows it. (Thank you John Pierpont Morgan for your Jekyll Island creation.)The tell is that his voice waivers when he is saying something that he hopes will come true but is unsure of. Listen to his speeches yourself and you’ll hear what I mean immediately. It’s the giveaway of a basically honest and decent man. Bernanke still needs to fully master the “FedSpeak” of his predecessor, Alan Greenspan. Alan could easily tell the House Banking Committee about how the Fed was fully in control - and there was nothing to worry about. And they believed it. Yet he was a protégé of Ayn Rand and the author of a marvellous essay on the need for gold-backed central banking in his youth. Years before he too became the head of the Fed.I truly hope that Chairman Bernanke can pull it all off just one more time. Like a junky hooked on ever-increasing doses of the good stuff, I need just a little more money, please. The withdrawal is too painful and I don’t want to hurt that much. I promise to go straight and reform in the future. Trust me. In fact, trust all of us. We’re all in this together.
Mr. Easton teaches University economics and is passionate about technology and entrepreneurship. He is rosy about the long-term future: �The glass isn�t half full, it�s overflowing!�
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